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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey does not deal with every case decided in the past twelve
months that might be said to be of interest to business owners, their advisors,
and others who follow business law developments. Cases of first impression,
decisions involving or identifying conflicts between the Florida District
Courts of Appeal, and questions certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as
being of great public importance are included. Cases that clarify or expand
upon existing principles of law are also included. This year's survey also
takes a look at a number of cases that, while procedural in nature, contain
concise analyses of some equitable principles and some unusual or not often
relied upon legal theories.
Many of these decisions address several areas of law. To the extent
possible, cases have been placed in the category that plays the most promi-
nent role in the court's discussion or decision.
I. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As usual, there were many arbitration cases decided over the course of
the last year. Summaries of some of the more significant ones follow.
A. Arbitration: Forum Selection Clause
After litigation had been instituted in Florida, the defendant asked the
trial court to compel arbitration in accordance with the consulting agreement
between the defendant and the plaintiff, which "provided for arbitration in
Arizona."' The trial court so ordered, but its order required that the arbitra-
tion be held in Florida instead of Arizona.2 The defendant appealed the part
of the trial court's ruling that ordered that the arbitration take place in Flori-
da.3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, which was the applicable law in this case, it was not proper for the
trial judge to unilaterally modify part of the arbitration provision. 4 The ap-
I. Remington Fin. Group, Inc. v. Anchors Aweigh Marine, Inc., 12 So. 3d 1264, 1265
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff had "not move[d] to strike the venue
provision," but the court did not discuss what impact, if any, such a motion by the plaintiff
might have had on the outcome of the appeal under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.; see 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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pellate court relied on its decision in BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,5 where it
held that if an arbitration clause is "not unconscionable as a whole," it must
be enforced as written.6
B. Arbitration Agreement Enforced
Dorothy Stern (Resident) executed an arbitration agreement with Life
Care Center of New Port Richey (Life Care) upon her admission.7 The arbi-
tration clause directed that the arbitrator be the American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA) and the applicable AAA rules be used in any arbitration be-
tween the parties.8 Resident sued Life Care, and Life Care asked the trial
court to order arbitration. 9 It seems, however, that more than five years be-
fore the lawsuit-and several years before the arbitration agreement was
executed-AAA had announced that it would no longer arbitrate nursing
home disputes unless the parties agreed to AAA arbitration after the dispute
arose.' ° The parties had not so agreed." Resident argued that AAA's policy
left the parties with no valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and the
trial court agreed. 2 Life Care appealed, and the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed. 13 Under the circumstances presented, section 682.04 of the
Florida Statutes required that the trial court appoint an arbitrator. 14
5. 970 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
6. Remington Fin. Group, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 1265 (citing BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,
970 So. 2d 869, 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
7. New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1085-86. Among other claims, Resident alleged that her rights as a resident of
a nursing home had been violated. Id. at 1085.
10. See id. at 1085-86.
11. See New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1086.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1086-87.
14. Id at 1087. The Second District Court of Appeal noted first that neither of the parties
had offered any evidence regarding their intent with respect to choosing the AAA, despite
Resident's argument that this was a "material term" of the agreement, and that the trial court
could not modify the agreement. Id. at 1086. The appellate court then commented that Resi-
dent failed to present evidence that the choice of arbitrator was an "integral part of the agree-
ment to arbitrate." New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1087. It is not clear,
however, that the result would have been different even if Resident had presented such evi-
dence, in light of the appellate court's statement immediately thereafter that "[wie also ob-
serve that the parties' arbitration agreement contains a severability clause." Id.
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C. Arbitration: Waiver of Right by Conduct
In the next two arbitration cases, the courts were asked to determine if
participation in litigation resulted in a waiver of a party's right to arbitrate.' 5
In Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, Mr. McLeod bought a home and
entered into a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and Security
Agreement, to which Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree) subsequently
became a party. 16 The agreement contained a binding arbitration clause.
17
Mr. McLeod died, and Ms. McLeod (Personal Representative), the surviving
spouse of Mr. McLeod, in her capacity as personal representative of the es-
tate of McLeod, became the plaintiff in a pending action that Mr. McLeod
had instituted against Green Tree.18 The complaint alleged that Green Tree
had violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act,' 9 and after Mr.
McLeod's death, Ms. McLeod added a wrongful death claim in what then
became the second amended complaint.20 Green Tree, which had previously
sought an order to compel arbitration, renewed its motion to compel arbitra-
21tion. ' Personal Representative then sought discovery in the lawsuit, and
Green Tree moved for protective orders with respect to discovery.22 After
much delay in the proceedings, the trial court ruled that Personal Representa-
tive could have ninety additional days of "arbitration related discovery. 23
Before the trial court ruled, however, counsel for both parties stipulated that
discovery beyond that related to arbitration, more specifically, discovery
going to the merits of the litigation, would constitute a waiver of Green
Tree's claim to arbitration.24  Green Tree then hired new counsel who
promptly made multiple discovery requests that went to the merits of the
action. 25 New counsel subsequently moved to compel that discovery and set
a hearing on its motion.26 However, Green Tree withdrew its requests for
discovery and its motion to compel, and it cancelled the scheduled hearing
15. See Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, 15 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2009); DFC Homes of Fla. v. Lawrence, 8 So. 3d 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
16. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 684.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 559.55 (2009).
20. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 684.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 685.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 685.
26. Id.
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on the discovery motion. When Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration
finally was heard, the trial court ruled that Green Tree had waived arbitration
because of the merits-related discovery.28 The Second District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the trial court, aligning itself with decisions of the Third and
Fifth District Courts of Appeal. 29 In order to do so, however, the court con-
cluded that it was necessary to "recede from" its decision in Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adams30 "to the extent that it is inconsistent
with the rule that we now adopt."31 In Merrill Lynch, the court had ruled that
participation in discovery by the party seeking to compel arbitration did not
constitute a waiver.32 The Second District Court of Appeal in Green Tree
held:
[W]e now hold that a party's participation in discovery related to
the merits of pending litigation is activity that is generally incon-
sistent with arbitration. Such activity-considered under the to-
tality of the circumstances-will generally be sufficient to support
a finding of a waiver of a party's right to arbitration. 33
Even where a party has filed a timely motion to compel arbitration, the
party can waive any right to arbitration that the party has because of actions
that are inconsistent with the request for arbitration. 4 And once waived, the
27. Id.
28. Id. at 686.
29. Id. at 688. (citing Olson Elec. Co. v. Winter Park Redevelopment Agency, 987 So. 2d
178, 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Estate of Orlanis v. Oakwood Terrace Skilled Nursing
& Rehab. Ctr., 971 So. 2d 811, 812-13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Coastal Sys. Dev., Inc.
v. Bunnell Found., Inc., 963 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, after reviewing cases decided by the First and Fourth Districts, con-
cluded that those courts have not ruled on whether engaging in merits-related discovery, in
and of itself, without other conduct inconsistent with arbitration, is insufficient to waive arbi-
tration. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 688. The Second District also noted that in
one of its post Merrill Lynch opinions the court found a waiver of the right to arbitrate and
held, without referring to Merrill Lynch, that engaging in discovery was one of the factors that
led the court to find that there had been a waiver of the party's claim for arbitration. Id. at 693
(citing Mora v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 913 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2005); Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adams, 791 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. App.
2001)).
30. 791 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
31. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 694.
32. Merrill Lynch, 791 So. 2d at 26. The appellate court rejected the alternative of dis-
tinguishing the case before it from the facts in Merrill Lynch. See Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
15 So. 3d at 690.
33. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 694.
34. Id. at 687 (citing Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681
(Fla. 1973)).
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right to arbitration cannot be revived without the opposing party's consent.
35
Propounding discovery on the merits of the case results in a waiver of arbi-
tration. 36 Green Tree's change of heart did not undo the actions previously
taken that were inconsistent with its claim that arbitration was required.37
Finally, the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether the dis-
avowal of its Merrill Lynch decision was unfair to Green Tree and should
have prospective application only. 38 The court decided that there was no
unfairness because of Green Tree's earlier stipulation regarding discovery.39
In the second waiver of arbitration by conduct case, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, in DFC Homes of Florida v. Lawrence,40 found that the
participation in litigation was limited and did not constitute a waiver of a
party's right to compel arbitration.4 ' The contract between DFC Homes of
Florida (DFC) and Lawrence contained an arbitration provision, and when a
dispute arose between them, it was arbitrated.4  The arbitrator found in
DFC's favor.43 Lawrence then filed an action against DFC in the circuit
court.44 In response, DFC filed a motion to compel further arbitration.45 The
trial court denied the motion observing that nothing required a second arbi-
tration.46 The appellate court noted that Lawrence had claimed that by pro-
ceeding in the court system and making settlement offers DFC had waived
its right to arbitrate. 47 The Fourth District Court of Appeal stated the general
rule that a party waives the contractual "right to arbitration by active partici-
pation ...before asserting that right., 48 However, to prove waiver, Law-
rence had to show that DFC had knowledge of the right to arbitrate but nev-
ertheless actively participated in litigation or took other action inconsistent
with arbitration. 49 Under the facts of DFC Homes, any of the alleged impro-
35. Id. (citing Williams v. Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc., 923 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
36. Id. at 688.
37. See id. at 690.
38. See Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 694-95.
39. Id.
40. 8 So. 3d 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
41. Id. at 1283-84.
42. Id. at 1282.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. DFC Homes, 8 So. 3d at 1282.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1283.
48. Id. (citing Strominger v. AmSouth Bank, 991 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008)).
49. See id. (citing Marine Envtl. Partners, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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per participation took place after the arbitrator had rendered his decision
against Lawrence. ° It was then that Lawrence instituted the action against
DFC. 51 Lawrence alleged that DFC "actively engaged" in the action by par-
ticipating in depositions, making settlement offers, filing a motion to dismiss
the suit for lack of prosecution, answering interrogatories, and participating
in mediation.52 The appellate court disagreed.53 DFC's participation in the
litigation was limited and took place only after it had exercised its right to
arbitrate.54 It did not even file an answer or an affirmative defense to Law-
rence's complaint. Attempting to settle a dispute cannot be characterized as
other action inconsistent with the right to arbitrate.56 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's denial of DFC's motion to compel arbitration.57
D. Arbitration and Discharge of Contractor's Claim of Lien
Brookshire v. GP Construction of Palm Beach, Inc.58 involved the en-
forcement of a statutory construction lien in the face of a binding arbitration
clause in the parties' agreement. 59 GP Construction of Palm Beach, Inc.
(Contractor) recorded a lien on the real estate owned by the Brookshires
(Owners).6° Owners, pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the Florida Statutes,
filed a complaint seeking to have the lien discharged.61 The clerk of the
court issued a summons to Contractor at which point Contractor had "to
show cause within 20 days why [its] lien should not be enforced by action or
vacated and canceled. 62 Contractor filed a motion to compel arbitration
under its agreement with Owners and set the motion for hearing, but it did
not start an action to enforce the lien.63 On appeal, Contractor said that it
filed the motion to compel arbitration rather than starting an action during
the twenty-day period so that there would not be any claim that it had waived
its right to arbitration. 64 The trial court granted Contractor's motion to com-
50. DFC Homes, 8 So. 3d at 1283.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. DFC Homes, 8 So. 3d at 1283.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1284.
58. 993 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
59. See id. at 179-80.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 180.
62. Id.
63. Brookshire, 993 So. 2d at 180.
64. See id.
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pel arbitration and did not discharge the lien.65 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, directing that the lien be discharged by the trial court.66
The statutory twenty-day response period does not provide for extensions or
other exceptions, and there is no discretion left to the courts. 67 If the lienor
fails to take the statutorily required action within the required time, the court
must discharge the lien.68 Had Contractor filed a counterclaim to Owners'
complaint during the statutory period, the lien could have been preserved.69
The appellate court noted that "[t]he lien, however, and the dispute, are not
one and the same, [and] disposition of the lien would not" have resolved the
issue of liability on Contractor's claim. 70
Although the decision represents an interpretation of a party's obliga-
tion under one statutory lien statute, the strict rule enunciated here may be
more far reaching than it appears. Will the principles set out here apply
equally to other situations where judicial action may be the statutory mandate
for enforcing a party's right or defending against the statutory right but the
parties have agreed to arbitrate all disputes? The Fourth District Court of
Appeal's ruling in this case and the cases cited therein should be carefully
considered.7'
Unlike the situation in Brookshire, where apparently there was no ap-
plicable exception to arbitration contained in the arbitration agreement,72 in
Greenberg v. Sellers73 there was an exception.74 The arbitration clause of the
operating agreement between the parties provided in part that "the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to injunctive and/or equitable relief in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction" notwithstanding the mandatory arbitration provision.75
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Sturge v. LCS Dev. Corp., 643 So. 2d 53, 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
68. Brookshire, 993 So. 2d at 180 (citing Sturge v. LCS Dev. Corp., 643 So. 2d 53, 55
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
69. See id. (citing Mainlands Constr. Co. v. Wen-Dic Constr. Co., 482 So. 2d 1369, 1370
(Fla. 1986)).
70. Id.
71. In Brookshire, Contractor took the position that its underlying claim for payment
would have to be arbitrated. Id. However, had that not been the case, could Contractor, if it
had chosen to do so, have successfully alleged that the Brookshires waived their right to arbi-
tration by seeking relief from the court under section 713.21(4) of the Florida Statutes? Ap-
propriate language in an arbitration agreement may eliminate some of the waiver concerns
presented in Brookshire.
72. See id.
73. 2 So. 3d 381 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
74. See id. at 383.
75. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that four out
of the five counts of the complaint were subject to arbitration.76 These
counts were for conversion, breach of contract and of fiduciary duty, and
violations under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.77
However, the appellate court reversed with respect to the first count, which
was for an accounting, since that was a request for equitable relief.78
E. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement
Disputes arose in connection with gas station leases between Petroleum
Realty I, LLC (Landlord) and Boca Petroco, Inc. (Tenant). 79 Landlord sued
for payment of rent and certain other amounts. 80 The oral settlement reached
just before trial addressed these issues, plus it required Tenant to file periodic
environmental reports with Landlord in accordance with the requirements of
the leases. 81 Tenant failed to make required payments in accordance with the
settlement agreement.82 Additional litigation ensued that included the fol-
lowing: the trial court enforced the settlement agreement; Tenant appealed;
the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed; Landlord obtained a writ of
possession with the trial court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement; Tenant again appealed; and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
again affirmed.83  Although the lease had expired prior to the appellate
court's second decision, and Tenant had been ordered to pay more than
$14,000,000 in damages for failure to pay the amounts due in accordance
with the settlement agreement, the matter did not end after the second trip to
the appellate court.84 Landlord subsequently sent notice to Tenant that Te-
nant was in default under the environmental provisions of the lease, and
based on provisions in the lease that imposed on Tenant the obligation to
undertake environmental clean-up efforts, and the alleged failure to file re-
ports under the settlement agreement, Landlord asked the trial court to exer-
cise its continuing enforcement jurisdiction, which the court did, awarding
76. Id. at 382-83.
77. Id. Presumably, only damages were sought on these claims.
78. Greenberg, 2 So. 3d at 383.
79. Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty I, LLC, 993 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1094.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1093.
84. Boca Petroco, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 1093.
[Vol. 34
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/3
2009] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 81
Landlord an additional $1,901,000 as the environment clean-up cost.85 Te-
nant again appealed, and the appellate court reversed as to the environmental
clean-up damages. 86 The environmental report requirement was part of the
settlement agreement, 87 but the award of clean-up damages was not.88 Those
damages resulted from the alleged breach of the original lease agreement.
89
The clean-up damage award was not an enforcement of the settlement
agreement. 90 Therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction, and Lan-
dlord would have to file another lawsuit to claim clean-up damages. 91
III. ATrORNEYS' FEES
A. Prevailing Party: Construction Lien
In Trytek v. Gale Industries, Inc.,92 the Supreme Court of Florida was
called upon to determine what "prevailing party" means in construction lien
litigation.93 Gale Industries, Inc. (Gale) was hired by the Tryteks to install
insulation in the home they were building.94 There was no dispute that dur-
ing the insulation installation by employees of Gale, the electrical system
was inadvertently damaged.95 Mr. Trytek and Gale agreed on the electrical
company that would make repairs, which was a company owned by Mr. Try-
tek.96 After the repairs were made, and the Tryteks had calculated the cost of
the repairs at $1 1,770, the Tryteks tried to offset that amount against the
amount Gale claimed it was owed for its work.97 Gale refused a check ten-
dered by Mr. Trytek in the amount of $736, which represented the net
85. Id. at 1094. This environment clean-up damage award was then included in a final
judgment for unpaid rent and other charges due pursuant to the settlement agreement. Id. The
balance of the trial court's judgment was affirmed. Id. at 1095.
86. Id. at 1094. The Fourth District noted that the Supreme Court of Florida, in Paulucci
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., explained that where a settlement agreement is incorporated into a
final judgment and jurisdiction is retained to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement,
the court can enforce terms included in the settlement agreement "even if the terms are outside
the scope of the remedy" that was requested in the complaint. Boca Petroco, Inc., 993 So. 2d
at 1094 (quoting Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 803 (Fla. 2003)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1095.
89. Id. at 1094.
90. Id.
91. Boca Petroco, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 1094-95 (citing Paulucci, 842 So. 2d at 803).
92. 3 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 2009).
93. Id. at 1196.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1196-97.
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amount the Tryteks determined was due to Gale.98 Gale then recorded a
$12,725 construction lien-with no offset for any part of the cost of repair.99
Based on the stipulations of the parties prior to trial, the only issue to be de-
cided by the judge was the amount of the damages Gale owed to the Try-
teks.'0° The judge found that the repair damages were $11,200, and, in ac-
cordance with the parties' stipulations, offset this amount against the $12,725
amount agreed by the parties to be due Gale.' l The result was a judgment
for Gale in the amount of $1525.102 Then the parties filed motions under the
construction lien statute seeking attorneys' fees as well as costs, each party
claiming "prevailing party" status for purposes of section 713.29 of the Flor-
ida Statutes. 10 3 The trial court determined that the test set forth by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Prosperi v. Code, Inc.1°4 was applicable.'0 5 The
trial court concluded that under the "significant issue" test of Prosperi, the
Tryteks had to be the prevailing party because the only "significant issues,"
in fact, "the only real issue" was the amount of the Tryteks' recovery on their
set-off counterclaim, "and the Tryteks primarily prevailed on their counter-
claim."' 6 Gale appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed,
concluding that the Prosperi "significant issues" determination is only appli-
cable if a "contractor is unsuccessful" in its action to foreclose on the lien.'17
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that Gale was successful since it
recovered a net amount of $1525 against the Tryteks, and therefore Gale was
the prevailing party and the Prosperi test did not apply. 10 8 The appellate
court reversed and remanded for a determination of the fees and costs for
Gale, and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. °9 The
Court rephrased the certified question as follows:
Where a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an
action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section
713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), are trial courts required to apply
the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v. Code, Inc.,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1197.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1197.
103. Id.
104. 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
105. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1197.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1198.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1196,1198.
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626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993), in determining which party, if any, is
the "prevailing party" for the purpose of awarding attorneys'
fees?" 0
The Court summarized "the main issue" as a question of "what factors
enter into a determination of 'prevailing party' pursuant to section
713.29...1. The Court stated "the specific issue" as:
whether the trial court is vested with discretion, or is even required
to consider, which party prevailed on the significant issues; or
whether the trial court is bound by an inflexible bright-line rule
that a prevailing party must be determined and that the contractor
must be considered the prevailing party if it obtains a judgment on
its lien in any amount in excess of an asserted set-off or counter-
claim.' 12
The Court referred to its decision in Prosperi for the proposition that
when a trial court is called upon to determine the "prevailing party" in a con-
struction lien litigation, it should look to which party prevailed on the "sig-
nificant issues" before the court. 13 The Court held that the "significant is-
sues test" applies even if a contractor prevails in its lien action. 114 Just be-
cause a contractor obtains a judgment on its lien in excess of a claimed set-
off or counterclaim does not automatically make it the prevailing party.'
15
Thus, the fact that a contractor obtains a "net judgment" is not necessarily a
controlling factor in determining the prevailing party, even though it may be
"a significant factor."''16 The Court remanded the matter to the trial court.'
However, the Court, relying on its decision in C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B.
Grove, Inc.," 8 made it clear that there does not have to be a prevailing party
in a construction lien case." 9 In substance, the Court gave trial judges consi-
derable discretion to determine if there is a prevailing party in section 713.29
cases and, if so, which party prevailed on the significant issue or issues. 20
110. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1196 (alteration in original).
Ill. Id. at 1198.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1201.
114. Id. at1202.
115. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1202.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1204.
118. 472 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1985).
119. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1203--04.
120. See id. While many issues raised by, and the potential problems identified in, the
cases in this survey may be resolved contractually, the issues presented by the Court's deci-
13
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B. Prevailing Party: Breach of Lease Agreement Dispute
In Civix Sunrise, GC, LLC v. Sunrise Road Maintenance Ass'n,121 Civix
Sunrise, GC, LLC (Lessee) bought real estate subject to a ninety-nine year
lease made in 1972.122 The lease required Lessee to operate a golf course on
the property. 123 Lessee was to also sell golf or country club memberships to
people residing on property adjoining the Civix property.' 24 After making
the purchase, Civix stopped operating the golf course and announced it was
planning to develop the property. 25  Various associations (Associations)
representing adjacent property owners successfully sued Lessee and pre-
vented it from developing the property. 126 Specifically, Associations per-
suaded the trial court to declare "that the lease had not been extinguished by
merger and [remained as] an encumbrance on the property.' ' 27 Associations
were the intended beneficiaries of parts of the lease, including that part man-
dating the operation of a golf course.128 Associations then asked for attor-
ney's fees pursuant to paragraph twenty of the lease, which so provided to
the prevailing party. 2 9 The trial court awarded fees to Associations as in-
tended third-party beneficiaries of the lease. 30 The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed.'3 ' An agreement as to attorney's fees in a contract must be
"clear and specific" to be enforceable. 132 Applying this test, the appellate
court found that the term "party" in the lease's fee clause referred only to the
signatory parties to the lease. 133 In other words, the Second District Court of
Appeal refused to read into the lease that these third-party beneficiaries of a
sion in Trytek do not appear to readily lend themselves to that solution. See Barbara Landau,
2007-2008 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 33 NOVA L. REV. 81, 98-99
(2008) [hereinafter Landau, 2007-2008 Survey] for a discussion of the Fourth District Court
of Appeal's decision in Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc., 984 So. 2d
564 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
"significant issue" test set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in Prosperi may not be
changed by contract. See Port-A-Weld, Inc., 984 So. 2d at 570.
121. 997 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
122. Id. at 434.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Civix Sunrise, GC, LLC, 997 So. 2d at 434.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Civix Sunrise, GC, LLC, 997 So. 2d. at 435.
132. Id. (citing Sholkoff v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 693 So. 2d 1114, 1118 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
133. Id.
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portion of the lease agreement were also beneficiaries of the attorney's fee
clause. 134
IV. BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS, ENTITIES, AND AGREEMENTS
A. Corporations: Special Law
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Florida in Lawnwood
Medical Center, Inc. v. Seeger,'35 was whether the St. Lucie County Hospital
Governance Law (HGL) 136 violated Florida's constitutional prohibition
against passing a law that includes the "'grant of [a] privilege to a private
corporation"' by special law or by a "'general law of local application."1
37
Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood), a for-profit corporation, owns
Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and Heart Institute in St. Lucie Coun-
ty.138 In 1993, Lawnwood's medical staff adopted Medical Staff Bylaws
(Bylaws). 139 The Bylaws were approved by Lawnwood's Board of Direc-
tors.' 4° Lawnwood needed to have the Bylaws to remain in good standing
with the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions.'4 ' There was no requirement that the Bylaws contain specific terms.
41
After the Bylaws were adopted, lawsuits were instituted as the result of
disputes that developed between the Lawnwood administration and the med-
ical staff. 14 3 Lawnwood turned to the legislature for help, which resulted in
the 2003 enactment of the HGL.' 44 The effect of the new law was to allow
Lawnwood's Board to trump virtually every decision made by the medical
staff pursuant to the Bylaws. 145 Lawnwood instituted suit to have the HGL
declared constitutional, but the trial court found the law to be unconstitution-
al. 46 The First District Court of Appeal agreed that the law was unconstitu-
134. Id.
135. 990 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2008).
136. Id. at 506.
137. Id. at 509 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I1l, § I I(a)(12)). Article Ill, section 1 (a) of the
Florida Constitution provides that "[t]here shall be no special law or general law of local
application pertaining to: ... (12) private incorporation or grant of privilege to a private cor-
poration." FLA. CONST. art. I11, § I l(a)(12).
138. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 990 So. 2d at 506.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 990 So. 2d at 507.
144. Id. at 507-08.
145. See id. at 508.
146. Id.
15
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tional. 47 Lawnwood appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida concluded
that the law was a special law, as it was expressly "intended to affect only
those privately operated hospitals located in St. Lucie County."' 148 In this
case of first impression, the Court's decision turned on the meaning of the
word "privilege," as used in article 1I, section 11 (a)(] 2) of the Florida Con-
stitution, a phrase not previously construed by the Court. 49 The Court cited
City of Plattsmouth v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 50 where the Supreme Court
of Nebraska defined "special privilege," as used in its constitution, as "'a
right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege granted to or vested in a per-
son or class of persons, to the exclusion of others and in derogation of com-
mon right.".''  The Supreme Court of Florida, applying principles of statuto-
ry construction, concluded that "privilege" is not limited to an economic
advantage and that a broad reading of the word "privilege" is consistent with
the 1968 addition of this provision to the Florida Constitution. 52 After so
concluding, the Court found that the HGL is a special law granting to a cor-
poration prohibited rights, benefits, and advantages amounting to a privi-
lege. 53 This special law "alter[ed] the balance of power" between Lawn-
wood and its medical staff. 154
B. Ultra Vires Doctrine
Cambridge Credit Counseling Corporation (Guarantor), a Massachu-
setts corporation, guaranteed the leasehold obligations of Brighton Credit
Corporation (Tenant) to 7100 Fairway, LLC (Landlord). 55  The guaranty
was made in connection with the assignment of the lease to Tenant by a third
party. 56 The assignment and the guaranty were both signed by John Puccio,
as president of Guarantor, and the guaranty provided that Guarantor was the
parent and owner of all of the shares of Tenant. 57 After Tenant defaulted on
147. Id.
148. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 990 So. 2d at 510. It was undisputed that the new law
"affected only the two private hospitals in St. Lucie County," both owned by the same parent
corporation. Id. at 508.
149. Id.at510.
150. 114 N.W. 588 (Neb. 1908).
151. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 990 So. 2d at 511-12 (quoting City of Plattsmouth, 114
N.W. at 590).
152. Id. at513-14.
153. Id. at518.
154. Id.
155. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp. v. 7100 Fairway, LLC, 993 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the lease during the fifth year, Landlord sued Tenant under the lease and
Guarantor under the guaranty agreement. 5 8 Tenant defaulted in the action
and judgment was entered against it, but Guarantor filed an answer with af-
firmative defenses. 159 Landlord's motion for summary judgment as to the
defenses raised by Guarantor was granted, and Guarantor appealed.' 6° Gua-
rantor had alleged as an affirmative defense that its guaranty was ultra vires
under the law of Massachusetts, the state in which it was incorporated.16'
Guarantor argued that Massachusetts law should be applied, and that under
the law of Massachusetts, a public charity is prohibited from guaranteeing
the obligations of another. 62 Guarantor claimed that it was a public charity
under Massachusetts law. 163 Although Guarantor apparently qualified as a
charity under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,' 64 the appellate
court was not convinced of Guarantor's status as a public charity under Mas-
sachusetts law. 165 However, Guarantor's status under Massachusetts law did
not matter since Florida law applied. 166 Not only was performance under the
lease and guaranty to be in Florida, but both instruments had "Florida choice
of law" provisions. 167 Under section 617.0304(2) of the Florida Statutes, the
claim of ultra vires is available only to corporate shareholders in derivative
actions or to the attorney general. 68 A corporation cannot rely on the ultra
vires doctrine as a defense to an agreement with a third party voluntarily
entered into by the corporation, and the trial court was affirmed.' 69 Guaran-
tor also had alleged that Mr. Puccio, as its president, did not have the actual
or apparent authority to execute the guaranty. 70 The Fourth District likewise
did not disturb the trial court's finding that Mr. Puccio had apparent authority
to sign the guaranty.' 7' The appellate court, quoting Lensa Corp. v. Poincia-
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 88.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
165. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 89.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 90-91. The court distinguished Chatlos Found., Inc. v. D'Arata, a case relied
on by Guarantor, because that case involved organizational or internal matters governed by
the state of incorporation, whereas this case involved transactions between the Guarantor and
third parties. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 90 (citing Chatlos Found.,
Inc. v. D'Arata, 882 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
170. Id. at 90.
171. Id.
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na Gardens Ass'n,7 2 listed the three elements necessary for there to be a
finding of apparent agency as follows: "'(1) a representation by the pur-
ported principal; (2) reliance on that representation by a third party; and (3) a
change in position by the third party in reliance [on the] representation.""1 73
Finding that the execution of the lease guaranty was an act done "in the ordi-
nary course of business," the Fourth District applied "the presumption of
authority" that has been "consistently recognized" by the courts with respect
to the acts of corporate presidents, finding that the first requirement was
met.'74 The reliance requirement was met because the guaranty itself said
that Landlord would not have agreed to the lease assignment without the
guaranty.175 The change of position requirement was met because Landlord
released the original tenant. 76 The appellate court concluded that there was
no remaining material question of fact. 177 But just in case there was still an
issue of fact regarding apparent authority, the Fourth District observed that
Guarantor was estopped from denying the validity of the guaranty five years
after signing it.'78 Therefore, the trial court correctly entered summary
judgment in favor of Landlord on this issue as well. 179
C. Piercing the Corporate Veil
IAT Group, Inc. (IAT) was the successful bidder for the purchase of
stock in two subsidiaries that were wholly owned by Grupo Empresarial
Agricola Mexicano, S.A. de C.V. (GEAM), a Mexican corporation, and Mr.
Abu-Ghazaleh was IAT's chairman.' 80 Mr. Bours was then the chairman of
GEAM.'8' The GEAM subsidiary involved in this appeal was Fresh Del
Monte Produce, NV (FDMP NV). 82 IAT formed a subsidiary, Fresh Del
Monte Produce, Inc. (FDMP Inc.) for the acquisition of the FDMP NV
stock. 83 Owners of a minority interest in GEAM, "identif[ying] themselves
as de facto shareholders of" FDMP NV (Plaintiffs), claimed that the pur-
172. 765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
173. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 90 (quoting Lensa Corp., 765 So.
2d at 298).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 90.
179. See id. at 91.
180. Chaul v. Abu-Ghazaleh, 994 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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chase and sale of the FDMP NV stock was tainted by dishonesty and sued to
recover damages for the alleged fraud.I 84  They sued IAT, Mr. Abu-
Ghazaleh, GEAM, Mr. Bours, and FDMP Inc. (collectively referred to as
Defendants), alleging that GEAM "received inadequate consideration" for
the sale of FDMP NV as a result of GEAM's then chairman's breach of his
fiduciary duty. 85 Defendants alleged that Plaintiffs lacked standing, but De-
fendants' summary judgment motion based on this argument was denied. 86
The case went to trial, and the jury found for Defendants. 187 Plaintiffs ap-
pealed, and Defendants filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of
their motion for summary judgment. 188 The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that the trial court should have granted Defendants' motion
for summary judgment.189 Plaintiffs' claims were derivative of their owner-
ship of stock in GEAM.' 90 They should have instituted "a shareholder deriv-
ative action. ' ' In addition, Plaintiffs could not get around the fact that their
claim was derivative by "invoking the alter ego doctrine."'' 92 They could
"not pierce their own corporate veil" to claim standing with respect to the
corporation's assets.' 93 A direct action by Plaintiffs would only have been
appropriate if the right Plaintiffs sought to enforce existed in them as stock-
holders of FDMP NV, which it did not.194 Plaintiffs also argued that the sale
of FDMP was a "de facto merger," but the appellate court did not agree. 9
5
D. Minority Shareholder Appraisal Rights
Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc. v. Sullivan,'96 while nominally about the
elements necessary to support injunctive relief, is instructive as to a minority
shareholder's stock appraisal rights under section 607.1 302(1)(d) of the Flor-
ida Statutes. 97 In Foreclosure Freesearch, Mr. Geisen (Majority Sharehold-
er) was the founder and majority shareholder of Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc.
184. Id. at 466-67. These shareholders held a total of direct and indirect ownership of 6.3
percent of the shares of GEAM. Chaul, 994 So. 2d at 467.
185. Id. at 466-67.
186. Id. at 466.
187. Id. at 467.
188. Id. at 466.
189. Chaul, 994 So. 2d at 466.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 467.
193. Id.
194. Chaul, 994 So. 2d at 467.
195. Id. at 467-68.
196. 12 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
197. Id. at 773.
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(Corporation), which in turn, was the defendant in an action instituted by the
minority shareholders, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mutillo (Minority Shareholders)
over various corporate matters including whether Minority Shareholders
were in fact shareholders of Corporation. 198 Claims and counterclaims were
made.199 Seeking to bring the litigation to a close, Majority Shareholder
caused Corporation to initiate a reverse stock split.2°° In this instance, a re-
verse stock split meant that Minority Shareholders would each end up with
less than one share-a fractional share-of Corporation, and the fractional
share of each of them would be purchased by Corporation. 20' The reverse
stock split invoked Minority Shareholders' statutory appraisal rights under
section 607.1302(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes. 2 2 Minority Shareholders
asked the trial judge to temporarily enjoin the appraisal process, claiming
that once their corporate interests were purchased, they would no longer have
standing to pursue their counterclaims. 20 3 The judge agreed and enjoined the
appraisal process. 204 The concern was that Majority Shareholder may be
liable for improper actions that reduced the value of Corporation. 20 5 If so,
ending the litigation in this manner, that is by virtue of having the appraisal
proceed, would prevent the ascertainment of the "true" value of Corporation
and the minority shares. 2°6
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed,2 7 concluding that injunc-
tive relief is an equitable remedy, and Minority Shareholders had an ade-
quate remedy at law.20 8 The appellate court held that "the appraisal process
provides an adequate remedy at law" noting that "'[s]tatutory proceedings
are regarded as law action. ' '' 209 In reaching its decision that the appraisal
process was to proceed, the Fourth District Court of Appeal relied on Wil-
198. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 773.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 774. This was the reason given by the
minority shareholder in Williams for what they called a "'conditional election of appraisal
rights"' which election was considered by the trial court to be "a nullity." Williams v. Stan-
ford, 977 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ha. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Hence the minority shareholders in
Williams were deemed by the trial court to have waived their appraisal rights, and they did not
appeal that ruling. Id.
204. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 774.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 778.
208. Id.
209. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 775-76 (quoting Adams v. Dade County,
202 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)).
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liams v. Stanford,2 " a 2008 decision of the First District Court of Appeal
involving shareholder appraisal rights under section 607.1302(1)." The
First District there held that if certain requirements were met, minority
shareholders could make a claim under section 607.1302(4)(b) of the Florida
Statutes that wrongful acts by a majority shareholder adversely affected val-
ue.212 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Foreclosure Freesearch stated
that if Minority Shareholders could support the claims, then, as held in Wil-
liams, they "'may be entitled to equitable remedies beyond an appraisal pro-
ceeding if the alleged acts have so besmirched the propriety of the chal-
lenged transaction that no appraisal could fairly compensate the aggrieved
minority shareholder.' 213 Minority Shareholders' counterclaim included a
count for breach of fiduciary duty by Majority Shareholder for misappropria-
tion of corporate funds and a count against Corporation for wrongfully with-
held distributions of profits. 2 4  Thus, although Majority Shareholder can
invoke the appraisal process to eliminate the rights of Minority Sharehold-
ers, 1 5 Minority Shareholders can challenge appraised value and, under the
Williams analysis, go beyond the appraisal pursuant to the fraud exception of
section 607.1302(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, provided they meet the re-
quirements set forth in Williams.1 6 The Fourth District Court of Appeal said
that "[b]ecause [Minority Shareholders] are not deprived of their ability to
seek relief beyond the appraisal if they satisfy the Williams analysis, they
have an adequate remedy at law. 21 7
E. Shareholders' Agreements: Arbitrability
In Breakstone v. Breakstone Homes, Inc.,18 the Shareholders' Agree-
ment between Breakstone Homes, Inc. (Corporation) and its shareholders
provided in part that "'[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
210. 977 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
211. See id. at 726-27; Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 86-87. The ap-
praisal rights in Williams derived from subsection (c) rather than subsection (d) of section
607.1302(l).
212. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So. 2d 722, 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
213. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 777 (citing Williams, 977 So. 2d at 730).
214. Id. at 773, 778.
215. Id. at 778. The appellate court extended the time within which Minority Shareholders
could exercise their appraisal rights to seven days after the date of the issuance of the court's
"mandate to exercise their rights in the appraisal process." Id.
216. Id. at 777.
217. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 778.
218. 999 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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this Agreement or a breach hereof shall be finally settled by arbitration.' 219
Corporation brought an action against Mr. Breakstone (Director), who was
one of three directors (and a shareholder), alleging breaches of fiduciary du-
ties as a director of Corporation. 220 Director sought an order compelling arbi-
tration, and in response, Corporation relied on Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp.,22I
where the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the three-pronged test that a
court must apply before it compels arbitration.222 Under the second prong of
the Seifert test, there must be "an arbitrable issue. 22 3 Corporation argued
that its claim was not arbitrable because it was "a tort claim 'unrelated to the
rights and obligations"' under the Shareholders' Agreement.224 The trial
court denied Director's motion to compel arbitration, and he appealed.225
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 226 The Shareholders' Agree-
ment here contemplated breach of fiduciary duty by a director and provided a
remedy.227 Corporation's claim was "significantly related to the rights and
obligations in the Agreement" and arbitration was required.228
F. Joint Venture
North Broward Hospital District (NBHD), having become a Trauma
Level 1[ hospital, needed general surgeons for its emergency room.229 NBHD
sought the services of several surgeons, asking them to form a corporation
that NBHD would deal with, rather than dealing with the surgeons indivi-
dually.2 30 Several surgeons, including Dr. Triana, decided that they would,
individually, through their own practices, as independent contractors, provide
surgical services to NBHD through contracts between NBHD and Fort Lau-
derdale Surgery Associates, P.A. (FLSA), a corporation newly formed for
219. Id. at 732 (emphasis omitted).
220. Id.
221. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
222. Breakstone, 999 So. 2d at 732. Under Seifert, the court must determine: (1) if there
is "a valid written agreement to arbitrate;" (2) if there is an arbitrable issue; and (3) if there
has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.
223. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.
224. Breakstone, 999 So. 2d at 732.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 733.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Amko, 993 So. 2d 167, 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
230. Id. The services were to be provided to persons who were indigent and did not have
insurance. Id.
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this purpose. 23' The surgeons' interests in FLSA would be based on the de-
gree of each surgeon's participation.232 When the corporation was formed,
the only stock issued was to Dr. O'Rourke.233 Four of the doctors other than
Dr. Triana were named the officers of FLSA.234 NBHD and FLSA then ex-
ecuted a written agreement that detailed the surgical services FLSA would
provide, specified standards to be met, and required Dr. O'Rourke to "over-
see" the other surgeons, including Dr. Triana.235 Dr. Triana and the other
surgeons signed agreements with FLSA that confirmed FLSA's arrangement
with NBHD and the surgeons' status as independent contractors for FLSA.236
Although these agreements were not signed by FLSA, the terms of the inde-
pendent contractor agreements were followed. 37 The surgeons subsequently
adopted "by-laws" which required that any decisions be by unanimous vote
of the surgeons.2 38 During the term of the various agreements, the other
surgeons voted to fire Dr. Triana.239 Dr. Triana sued FLSA and the three
doctors who were then the officers of FLSA. 240 Dr. Triana alleged that a
breach of fiduciary duty owed to him under their joint venture had occurred,
arising out of the absence of adherence to corporate formalities and by virtue
of firing him.24' The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, reasoning that even if there had been a joint venture, it termi-
nated when FLSA was formed, the purpose of the joint venture's creation
having been realized.242 The trial court ruled that under corporate law, the
decision to fire Dr. Triana was reasonable, and thus proper under "the busi-
ness judgment rule." 243 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the
law as to when there is a termination of a joint venture.24 The formation of a
corporation may not be the end of a joint venture if forming the corporation
231. Id. at 168-69.
232. Id. at 169.
233. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 169.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 169.
239. Id. Dr. Triana objected to the firing based on the absence of unanimous consent. Id.
He then learned that no FLSA stock had been issued to him. Id.
240. Id. One of the officers died before Dr. Triana was fired. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc.,
993 So. 2d at 168 n. 1.
241. Id. at 169-70.
242. Id. at 170. With respect to another count that was based upon the unsigned agree-
ment with FLSA, the appellate court found that there were material factual issues and sum-
mary judgment should not have been granted to FLSA on this count. Id. at 171.
243. Id. at 170.
244. See Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 170.
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was not the purpose of the joint venture, but rather was a means to an end.245
Here, there were material issues of fact remaining as to whether there was a
continuing joint venture.246 Joint venturers owe each other a fiduciary du-
ty.247 By failing to decide the factual issue of whether a joint venture existed
and its proper purpose, the trial court's application of the business judgment
rule was error.248
V. CONSUMER RIGHTS
Ocana v. Ford Motor Co.249 sets forth some important principles with
respect to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA)250 and its interaction
with state law. 1 Mr. Ocana leased a Land Rover from Warren Henry Au-
tomobiles, Inc. (Dealership). 2  The Land Rover was new and came with a
"New Vehicle Limited Warranty" from Ford Motor Company (Ford).253
Dealership assigned to Mr. Ocana all of Dealership's rights under the "stan-
dard manufacturer's new vehicle warranty. '254 The lease agreement stated
that Mr. Ocana was taking the Land Rover "AS IS" and the provision con-
tinued, also in capital letters, with the statement that "NO WARRANTIES
OR REPRESENTATIONS, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED" with respect
to any part of the Land Rover were being made.255 The provision included a
statement, still in capital letters, that there was "NO WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS ... FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE., 256 Mr. Ocana then sued Ford and Dealership for breach of "ex-
press and implied warranties [under the MMWA]. 257 He alleged that the
vehicle had been taken back to Dealership at least four times for repairs in
the first year of the lease.258 The complaint was dismissed with prejudice,
245. Id. (citing Donahue v. Davis, 68 So. 2d 163, 171 (Fla. 1953)).
246. Id. at 17 i.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 992 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
250. See id. at 322; Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2006).
251. See Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 322-23; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 672.313 (2009).
252. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 322.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 322. Mr. Ocana alleged that Ford and Dealership "fail[ed] to
repair the vehicle within a reasonable amount of time or reasonable number of repair at-
tempts" under the MMWA. Id. at 322-23.
258. Id. at 322.
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and Mr. Ocana appealed.2 19 The appellate court noted that Mr. Ocana was
trying to utilize a portion of the MMWA that applies only to full warran-
ties,260 and which allows a consumer to choose between taking a refund for
the defective product or a replacement free of charge if "a defect or malfunc-
tion" has not been remedied by the warrantor "after a reasonable number of
attempts. 26' Mr. Ocana's problem, according to the appellate court, was that
this option under the MMWA applies only to full warranties and not to li-
mited warranties.262 Ford had given a limited warranty.263 This meant that
Mr. Ocana was required to prove breach of Ford's limited warranty. 264 This
in turn required proof "that Ford refused or failed to adequately repair a cov-
",265 cn 266ered item. Mr. Ocana only proved the car was taken in four times.
Although the MMWA authorizes a federal cause of action for breach of im-
plied warranty, such a claim must be based on state law principles.267 In
Florida, privity of contract is required to support a claim of implied warranty,
and Mr. Ocana did not have privity of contract with Ford.26s He failed to
prove that Dealership was acting as Ford's agent in the lease transaction,
which was necessary to establish privity.269 As to Mr. Ocana's claim against
Dealership, the Third District Court of Appeal first noted that in an "as is"
contract, "'causation is generally negated as a matter of law.' 27" The con-
sumer assumes the risk.27' Dealership also clearly and conspicuously dis-
claimed any and all warranties and representations. 272 The court acknowl-
edged that Mr. Ocana relied on Gates v. Chrysler Corp. ,273 where the Fourth
District applied the Magnuson-Moss refund/replacement consumer option to
259. Id. at 323.
260. Id.; see Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2303(a)(1), 2304(a) (2006).
261. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 323 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4)).
262. See id. at 325.
263. Id. at 323.
264. Id. at 324.
265. Id.
266. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 324.
267. See id. at 323-24.
268. Id. at 325-26.
269. Id. at 326.
270. Id. at 327 (quoting Owens v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 541 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871
(N.D. Tex. 2008)).
271. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 327.
272. Id.
273. 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
25
Landau: 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
limited warranties.274 The Third District described Gates as an "outlier," but
did not certify conflict with it to the Supreme Court of Florida.275
VI. CONTRACTS
A. Contract Reformation
The litigation in Goodall v. Whispering Woods Center LLC276 arose out
of a real estate purchase agreement that followed a deposit agreement.277
Buyer alleged that the deposit agreement required Seller, who was also the
developer, to raise the ceiling height of the purchased suites to twelve feet,
and that the purchase price as stated in the deposit agreement included the
price for the change in the height of the ceilings. 8 Buyer also alleged that
Seller promised that the purchase agreement would be drafted with terms
identical to those in the deposit agreement. 279 However, the purchase agree-
ment provided for a ceiling height of ten feet, not twelve feet.280 The pur-
chase agreement also contained a boilerplate clause, in capital letters, with
language to the effect that Buyer had read each and every provision, that the
purchase agreement constituted the entire agreement, and prior written or
oral agreements, representations, or statements not reflected or included in
the purchase agreement were without effect. 28' Seller refused to build out the
ceilings to twelve feet, and Buyer sued Seller.282 Buyer sought reformation
of the contract, alleged that Seller breached the reformed contract, sought
rescission, and also claimed unjust enrichment.283 The trial court found that
Buyer had not stated any cause of action and dismissed Buyer's complaint
with prejudice.284 Buyer appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the rescission and unjust enrichment
claims, but reversed the dismissal of the reformation and breach of the re-
274. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 324.
275. Id. at 325.
276. 990 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
277. Id. at 697.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 697-98.
280. Id. at 698.
281. Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 698.
282. Id. at 697.
283. Id. at 698-99.
284. Id. at 699.
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formed contract claims.2 85 The appellate court reviewed the rules regarding
reformation.286
First addressed was the rule allowing the equitable remedy of reforma-
tion of a written instrument that does not accurately express the parties' in-
tent because of a mutual mistake.287 In such a case, the defective agreement
or instrument "is not altered;" it is just reformed so that it reflects the parties'
actual intent.28
8
Second, a mutual mistake may be the result of "scrivener's error or in-
advertence" so that what the parties agreed to is not what gets expressed in
the agreement when reduced to writing. 289 Third, reformation is also availa-
ble in the case of a mistake by only one of the parties where the other party
has engaged in inequitable conduct.290 The appellate court held that Buyer's
allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.2 9' Buyer had
sufficiently pled a claim for reformation on the ground of mutual mistake.292
Buyer had also sufficiently pled inequitable conduct on the part of Seller.293
Seller's argument that the boilerplate "merger and integration clause" in the
purchase agreement prevented Buyer from seeking reformation-an equita-
ble remedy-was rejected by the court.9 Also of no help to Seller was its
argument that the complaint should be dismissed because Buyer "was negli-
gent in failing to read the Agreement carefully" before signing it.295 Accord-
ing to the appellate court, signing an agreement "without reading it with
care" normally results in the signer being bound.296 However, the appellate
court found that the exception under section 157, comment b, of the Res-
tatement (Second) of Contracts was applicable since the parties had agreed
on the terms that were supposed to be included in the purchase agreement.
297
Thus, mere "negligence in failing to read the writing does not" prevent an
action for reformation of the agreement. 298 Gross negligence would need to
be shown, and the question of whether there was gross negligence on the part
285.
286.
287.
riam)).
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
Id. at 697.
See Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 699.
Id. (quoting Tobin v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 948 So. 2d 692, 696 (Fla. 2006) (per cu-
Id.
Id. (citing Providence Square Ass'n v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1372 (Fla. 1987)).
Id. (citing Providence Square Ass'n, 507 So. 2d at 1372 n.3).
See Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 697, 699.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 700.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. b (1981)).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. b).
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of Buyer was a question of fact not properly decided on a motion to dis-
miss.29
9
B. Specific Performance
Landlord, as seller, and Tenant, as buyer, signed an instrument styled
"Affidavit." 3°° The instrument provided for sale and purchase of commercial
real estate described in the affidavit by street address and property folio
number.30 ' The purchase price was stated as $200,000 with an initial
$59,000 deposit and an additional $25,000 to be paid prior to closing. °2
Closing was not to be after December 31, 2004.303 Tenant alleged that the
parties verbally agreed to postpone the closing for almost a year and that
Landlord ultimately refused to proceed to closing.3° Tenant sued Landlord
seeking specific performance and damages for breach of contract.305 The
trial court dismissed Tenant's complaint, and Tenant appealed. 306 The Third
District Court of Appeal, relying on Rundel v. Gordon,30 7 agreed with the
trial court that the affidavit was not sufficiently definite to warrant specific
performance. 38 However, the trial court should not have dismissed the dam-
ages claim. 3°9 Landlord's argument that if the terms of the affidavit were not
specific enough to justify specific performance, then they were not specific
enough to warrant a damage award was rejected.3'0 The Third District Court
held that less certainty as to the terms of a contract is required in a suit for
damages than is required to obtain specific performance.3 1
299. Id. at 701 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. City of Ocala, 149 So. 381,386 (Fla. 1933)).
300. Alzate v. Lazaro, 992 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Alzate, 992 So. 2d at 425. The trial court, in dismissing the second amended com-
plaint, granted leave to Tenant to again amend so as to seek a refund of the deposit. Id. at
425-26.
306. Id.
307. 11I So. 386 (Fla. 1927).
308. Alzate, 992 So. 2d at 426 (citing Fox v. Sails at Laguna Club Dev. Corp., 403 So. 2d
456, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Socarras v. Claughton Hotels, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1057,
1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
309. See id.
310. Id.
311. Id. The trial court also had dismissed plaintiff's fraud claim, and the appellate court
concurred. Alzate, 992 So. 2d at 427.
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C. Statute of Frauds
In Brace v. Comfort,312 Mr. and Mrs. Brace (Plaintiffs) sued Ms. Com-
fort (Comfort), as well as Steven King (King) and Stirling V. Realty, a Flori-
da Limited Partnership owned by King (King/Stirling), and Roy D. Boone
(Boone) (collectively referred to as the Other Defendants), in connection
with a business deal that involved real estate.313 There were some compli-
cated transactions between and among the parties, but the result was that
King/Sterling ultimately transferred the subject real property to Boone, who
was Comfort's father.3 14 Plaintiffs alleged that the property should have been
transferred to them by virtue of their written agreement with Comfort, which
agreement they further alleged had been ratified by King/Stirling.315 Plain-
tiffs filed a complaint against Comfort and the Other Defendants. 3 6 There
were counts that sought declaratory relief and specific performance.3 7 Other
counts alleged civil conspiracy, tortious interference with a contract, unjust
enrichment, and promissory estoppel.1 8 Citing Florida's statute of frauds,
section 725.01 of the Florida Statutes, the trial court dismissed most of the
counts against the Other Defendants, and Plaintiffs appealed.1 9 With respect
to the claim for declaratory relief, the Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed, ruling that the statute of frauds was not a bar.320 That claim was ac-
tually based on two written agreements and sought a declaration of Plaintiffs'
and Boone's respective rights under those agreements. 321 Therefore, because
the request for a declaratory judgment was based on written agreements, the
trial court should not have dismissed that count.322 The appellate court also
held that the statute of frauds was not a bar to the unjust enrichment and
promissory estoppel claims, and the appellate court reversed the trial court
with respect to these claims.32 3 However, with respect to the specific per-
formance claim, since there was no contract between Plaintiffs and Boone,
the party against whom Plaintiffs sought specific performance, the trial court
312. 2 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
313. Id. at 1008-09.
314. See id. at 1009.
315. See id. at 1009, 1011-12.
316. Id. at 1009-10.
317. Brace, 2 So. 3d at 1009-12.
318. Id. at 1010.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1011.
321. Id. at 1010.
322. Brace, 2 So. 3d at 1011.
323. Id. at 1011, 1013.
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was affirmed on its dismissal of that claim.324 On the other hand, the claims
for civil conspiracy and for tortious interference with contract were not
barred by the statute of frauds.325 These claims were improperly dismissed
by the trial court because the claims were based on improper actions rather
than the contracts themselves.326
D. Third Party Beneficiary Contract and the Undertaker Doctrine
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Securitylink from Ameritech, Inc.,327 Secu-
ritylink from Ameritech, Inc. (Alarm Company) installed an alarm system
for Original Worldwide, Ltd. (Owner) pursuant to their agreement, which
also provided that Alarm Company was to monitor the alarm in Owner's
warehouse. 328 Alarm Company then hired Vanguard Security, Inc. (Security
Company) to inspect and investigate alarm signals from the warehouse when
notified by Alarm Company that the alarm had sounded.329 On the occasion
in question, the warehouse alarm sounded four times and Security Company
sent a guard to investigate the first three times, finding nothing suspicious.
3 °
When the alarm sounded for the fourth time, Alarm Company asked Owner
to have someone go to the warehouse, and it was only then, on the fourth
trip, that a theft was discovered. 33' Travelers Insurance Company (Insurer)
paid Owner's claim and then, as subrogee, sued Alarm Company and Securi-
ty Company.332 Insurer alleged that Alarm Company and Security Company
(referred to collectively as Companies) were negligent, and Insurer included
a claim for gross negligence.333 There were also allegations of breach of
contract against both Companies.334 The trial court determined, as a matter
of law, that there was no duty owed by Security Company to Owner, and all
of Insurer's claims against Security Company were dismissed.335 Insurer
appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed.336 In addition to
324. Id. at 1012. The appellate court's affirmance on this claim was based on different
reasoning than that of the trial court. Id.
325. ld. at 1011.
326. Brace, 2 So. 3d at 1011.
327. 995 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
328. Id. at 1176.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. There was a ladder that descended from a skylight that was broken, and merchan-
dise was determined to be missing. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1176.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1176.
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relying on "well-settled" Florida law that a non-contracting, but intended
beneficiary, may sue for breach of contract, the Third District also relied on
Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,337 where the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the "undertaker doctrine" of section 324A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.338 Under the doctrine, liability may be found for
physical harm that results to a third party if the actor undertakes to provide
services, even without compensation, which the actor should know are ne-
cessary to protect the third party, including the possessions of the third party,
and the actor does not act with reasonable care.339 In order for the doctrine to
apply, the lack of reasonable care must have "increase[d] the risk of harm,"
the actor must have undertaken the performance of a duty that another owes
to the third party, and the harm is the result of the reliance by the other party
or the third party on the actor's undertaking.3" The appellate court found
that Insurer's allegations were sufficient under this doctrine. 34'
E. Forum Selection Provision
AT&T Corp. sued Travel Express Investment, Inc. (Travel Express) in
Seminole County, Florida.342 Travel Express sought dismissal of the breach
of contract action, alleging improper venue.343 Travel Express relied on a
clause in the parties' contract which provided that "[t]he parties consent to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located in New York City, USA.'344
The trial court denied Travel Express's motion to dismiss, and Travel Ex-
337. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
338. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1177; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A
(1965).
339. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1177 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
324A).
340. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A).
341. Id. at 1177-78. Security Company also argued that the dismissal of the complaint
was proper because it was found that that there had been full performance of its contractual
obligation, that is, that Alarm Company had exercised reasonable care. Id. at 1178. The ap-
pellate court said this determination should not have been made on a motion to dismiss. Id.
342. Travel Express Inv., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 14 So. 3d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
343. Id.
344. Id. The appellate court pointed out that the contract was "prepared by AT&T for its
customer." Id. But this was not a case of the court finding an ambiguity and resolving it
against the party that drafted the contract. The court said that "[t]his exclusivity provision
clearly makes this clause unambiguous and mandatory." Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d.
at 1227 (relying on Weisser v. PNC Bank, N.A., 967 So. 2d 327, 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2007)); see also TECO Barge Line, Inc. v. Hagan, 15 So. 3d 863, 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2009). Thus, the exclusive forum was New York. Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d at
1227.
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press appealed. 45 The Fifth District noted that forum selection clauses "fall
into two categories: mandatory and permissive. 346 Although the distinction
to be made is generally between a clause by which the parties "consent" to,
but do not require a particular jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a clause
where filing of a suit in a specified forum is "required," on the other hand,
the issue in this case was different. 347 The question presented was the effect
of the word "exclusive" in the applicable provision of the parties' contract.
34 8
The Fifth District, relying on its decision in Sonus-USA, Inc. v. Thomas W.
Lyons, Inc., 9 and agreeing with the Third District in Weisser v. PNC Bank,
N.A.,350 which involved "[a]n almost identical clause," concluded that the
provision was of the mandatory variety. 5 What made it mandatory was the
use of the word "exclusive. ' '352 Had the parties merely consented to the ju-
risdiction of the courts located in New York City, the clause would have
been permissive and venue in Seminole County would likely not have been
disturbed.3 53 Having found that the clause was "unambiguous and mandato-
ry," the appellate court ruled that the clause would only be set aside upon a
showing that it would be unfair, unreasonable, or unjust to enforce the provi-
sion.354 There having been no such showing, the decision of the trial court
was reversed. 5
F. Liability Disclaimers
The Roses purchased a fire alarm system from ADT Security Services,
Inc. (ADT).356 Shortly after the service agreement was signed by the Roses
and the alarms were installed, there was a fire in their house.3 57 The alarms
did not send a fire signal and the house was completely destroyed.358 State
Farm Insurance Company (State Farm), the Roses' homeowners insurer, paid
345. See Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d at 1225.
346. Id. at 1226.
347. See id.
348. Id. at 1226.
349. 966 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
350. 967 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
351. Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d at 1226-27.
352. Id. at 1227.
353. See id.
354. Id. at 1226-27 (quoting Aqua Sun Mgmt. v. Divi Time Ltd., 797 So. 2d 24, 24-25
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
355. Id. at 1227.
356. Rose v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 989 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(per curiam).
357. Id.
358. Id. The facts stated that the house was presumably struck by lightning. Id.
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the Roses' policy claim, and State Farm then sued ADT on various theo-
ries.9 The trial court granted ADT's motion for summary judgment, con-
cluding that none of the theories stated a cause of action, and the Roses and
State Farm appealed. 360 The first theory addressed by the First District was
the "fraud in the inducement" claim based on a representation of the sales-
man.36' It was undisputed that when the salesman from ADT met with the
Roses, he "represented that the Roses would never lose their house to a fire
and that the alarm and fire detection system would save the lives of the Ros-
es' dogs and family members in the event of a fire. 362 The written service
contract entered into between the Roses and ADT several weeks later, which
agreement required ADT to install the fire alarm system and "provide securi-
ty and fire detection services," had numerous liability and warranty limita-
tions and disclaimers.363 The district court acknowledged that the rule in
Florida is that summary judgment generally should not be granted with re-
spect to a fraud claim, but said that there are situations where summary
judgment on a fraud claim is proper.3 4 The court concluded that summary
judgment was proper in this case because there could not have been justifia-
ble reliance by the Roses on what the salesman said.365 According to the
First District, there could be no justifiable reliance because the agreement
provided in capitalized print that:
NO ALARM SYSTEM CAN GUARANTEE PREVENTION OF
LOSS, THAT HUMAN ERROR ON THE PART OF ADT OR
THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE,
AND THAT SIGNALS MAY NOT BE RECEIVED IF THE
TRANSMISSION MODE IS CUT, INTERFERED WITH, OR
OTHERWISE DAMAGED.... CUSTOMER AGREES THAT
ANY REPRESENTATION, PROMISE, CONDITION, INDUCE-
MENT OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, NOT
359. Id. State Farm, proceeding under the policy's subrogation provision, alleged "breach
of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, fraud in the inducement and deceptive trade practices under section 501.211,
Florida Statutes" by ADT. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1246. Summary judgment was conceded by
the Roses and State Farm to be warranted with respect to the deceptive trade practices claim.
Id. at 1246 n.I.
360. Id. at 1246.
361. Id. at 1247.
362. Id. at 1246.
363. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1246.
364. Id. at 1247.
365. Id. at 1248.
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INCLUDED IN WRITING IN THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
NOT BE BINDING UPON ANY PARTY.... 366
The agreement also contained language in boldface capital letters that
the Roses had read and understood the agreement.367
With respect to product liability based on theories of strict liability and
warranty, the First District ruled that the case "sounded in contract" because
of the contract between ADT and the Roses.368 Therefore, this was a contract
claim, not a tort claim, and the Florida Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
applied.369 It was permissible under the UCC for ADT to disclaim warranties
including "'implied warranties of merchantability and fitness'"'-provided
the written disclaimer was conspicuous, expressly referred to merchantability
and the Roses understood what was being done.370 Here, the warranty dis-
claimers met those requirements.37'
In the agreement, ADT also prominently disclaimed incidental and con-
sequential damages based on negligence.372 The First District upheld the
negligence disclaimer, observing that while negligence disclaimers are not
favored in the law, they will be upheld if they are "'so clear and understand-
able that an ordinary and knowledgeable party will know what he is contract-
ing away.' ' 373 The First District decided that the negligence liability dis-
claimers were sufficiently "clear and unequivocal. 374 Also, there was no
showing that ADT violated a statute under which it had "a positive statutory
duty to protect the well-being of' another.375
Waivers of liability for negligence are also covered in the Torts section
of this survey.376 Of particular importance is the Supreme Court of Florida's
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1247-48.
368. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1248.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1248-49.
371. Id. at 1248.
372. Id. at 1249.
373. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1249 (quoting Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
374. Id.
375. Id. Contra Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So. 2d 758, 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that Florida law places a duty on building contractors to remain liable
"for personal injury caused by their negligent acts"). See Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra
note 120, at 127.
376. See infra Part XV.
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decision regarding the validity of pre-injury waivers of liability by parents of
minors in the context of commercial activities.
377
G. Exclusive Real Estate Listing
The owner of real estate (Owner) signed a real estate listing agreement
with a real estate broker (Listing Agent) that stated in part:
Exclusive Brokerage Listing. The exclusive agent for all Units...
shall be . ..("Listing Agent") for a term of ten (10) years ....
Listing Agent shall be the sole listing broker for all Units within
the Condominium, and be entitled to payment of a commission on
all sales and leases of Units within the Condominium.
378
Owner entered into a lease with respect to a building that was part of the
condominium project but no broker was used. 379 Listing Agent sued for a
commission.380  Both parties relied on definitions in Florida Real Estate
Principles, Practices & Law by Linda L. Crawford.38' In this treatise, a dis-
tinction is made between an "exclusive-agency listing" and an "exclusive-
right-of-sale listing. '382 In the former, an owner may sell the subject proper-
ty without owing a commission, provided the buyer did not learn about the
property from the broker or someone acting on behalf of the broker.383 In the
latter, it does not matter who sells the property during the term of the list-
ing.384 The broker is entitled to a commission, even if the owner is the sel-
ler.38' Thus, applying the distinction between the "exclusive right to sell"
where the broker is entitled to a commission regardless of whether a broker
is involved in the sale, and an "exclusive agency" where the owner still has
the right to sell without having to pay a commission, the court determined
that the listing agreement in this case was of the exclusive-agency type.
386
377. See Kirton v. Fields (Fields 11), 997 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2008); see also infra notes
820-47 and accompanying text.
378. Fischer-Gaeta-Cromwell, Inc. v. Oakwood St. Enters., LLC, 997 So. 2d 1271, 1272
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
379. Id. at 1271-72.
380. Id. at 1271.
381. Id. at 1272.
382. Id.
383. Fisher-Gaeta-Cromwell, Inc., 997 So. 2d at 1272.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See id.
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Thus, under the facts presented, Listing Agent was not entitled to a commis-
387sion.
VII. DEEDS AND TAX SALES, MORTGAGES, LIS PENDENS, AND PARTITION
A. Lis Pendens Damages
This appeal arose out of a lis pendens, notice of which was filed by
Buyer in connection with its suit against Sellers for specific performance of a
contract for sale of a commercial building.388 The trial judge required that
Buyer post a lis pendens bond.389 Sellers ultimately prevailed on the merits
in the specific performance action.39 ° Sellers then sought damages against
the bond, including damages for lost rent and other expenses.39 ' The trial
court refused to award damages to Sellers because the value of the property
had increased substantially during the period that the lis pendens was in ef-
fect. 392 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 393 Damages would be
appropriate only if the property had declined in value by the time the lis pen-
dens was lifted.394 With respect to the lost rent claim, the appellate court
noted that when the lis pendens bond was ordered to be posted, the court
ruled, without objection by Sellers, that Sellers would not be entitled to dam-
ages for lost rent given the lamentable condition of the building on the prop-
erty-it was un-rentable. 395 Thus, it was not necessary to address what the
measure of damages might have been for lost rent.396 The appellate court
found no other damages.397
387. Id.
388. Levin v. Lang, 994 So. 2d 445, 445-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied,
13 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 2009) (unpublished table decision).
389. Id. at 446. The title search showed a substantial lien on the property which sellers did
not pay. Id. at 445. Since the lis pendens was not based on a recorded instrument, the trial
court had the discretion under section 48.23(3) of the Florida Statutes to require a lis pendens
bond. See FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (2009); Levin, 994 So. 2d. at 446.
390. Levin, 994 So 2d. at 447. The trial court ruled in favor of Buyer in the underlying
action, and Sellers appealed. Id. at 445-46. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court and directed that judgment be entered for Sellers. Id. at 447.
391. Id. at 446.
392. Id.
393. Levin, 994 So. 2d at 447.
394. See id. at 446-47.
395. Id. at 446.
396. See id.
397. Levin, 994 So. 2d at 447.
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B. Wrongful Discharge of Lis Pendens Bond
The Haven Center (Seller) and Mr. Meruelo (Buyer) entered into an
agreement for the sale to Buyer of twenty-one acres of the Seller's real estate
for $10,500,000.398 Disputes arose between the parties, and Buyer sued Sel-
ler in 2005, recording a lis pendens when he filed the complaint. 399 The trial
court required that Buyer post a lis pendens bond in the amount of
$1,000,000 to cover any damages that might result from a wrongful filing of
the lis pendens. ° In 2008, Buyer asked the trial court for permission to "re-
linquish" the lis pendens, and if so permitted, that the lis pendens bond be
discharged.40 1 Buyer's motion was heard the day after notice of it was giv-
en.402 No evidence was considered by the trial court, although the court did
consider memoranda and legal argument by the parties . The trial court
granted Buyer's motion and directed the clerk of the circuit court to release
the bond.4"4 Seller successfully petitioned the Third District Court of Appeal
for a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court's order.405 The lis pendens was
a cloud on Seller's title for almost three years. 4°6 The lis pendens bond not
only protects the public, it also serves to protect the owner of property from
damages that result from the filing and recording of a lis pendens by a party
who then fails to prevail in the underlying action.4 °7 Voluntarily withdraw-
ing the lis pendens does not automatically result in the discharge of the bond,
especially when the conditions stated in the bond for its discharge have not
been met.4 8 Seller was entitled to a ruling by the court as to whether the
recording of the lis pendens was proper, that is, that Buyer had prevailed
regarding his alleged interests in the property. 409 If Buyer had not prevailed,
then Seller was entitled to an opportunity to prove its damages that may be
recovered under the bond.4'0 The bond did not contain any provision that
398. Haven Ctr., Inc. v. Meruelo, 995 So. 2d 1166, 1166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per
curiam).
399. Id. at 1166-67.
400. Id. at 1167. Seller sought discharge of the lis pendens, or alternatively, that a bond be
required in the amount of $1,000,000. Id.
401. Id.
402. Haven Ctr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1166.
406. Id. at 1167.
407. See Haven Cr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 1167-68.
410. Id. at 1168. The Third District Court, in dicta, briefly discussed what is ordinarily
necessary to prove such damages. Id. The court said that "appraisal testimony or other evi-
37
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made it conditional on the continued term of the lis pendens. 41" Furthermore,
there is nothing in the applicable statute, section 48.23 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, or in the case law, that provides any such condition.412
C. Unrecorded Mortgage Assignment
In JP Morgan Chase v. New Millennial, L. C.,4 13 Mr. Jahren purchased
real estate in Pinellas County and financed the transaction with money from
two mortgage loans made to him by AmSouth.4 14 The AmSouth mortgages
were recorded in Pinellas County.4"5 In 2004, AmSouth assigned the mort-
gages to JP Morgan Chase (JP Morgan). 416 JP Morgan did not record the
assignment. 47 In 2006, Mr. Jahren and New Millennial entered into a sale
and purchase agreement for the Pinellas County real estate, with Branch
Banking & Trust Company financing New Millennial's purchase.41 8 The title
search performed on behalf of New Millennial disclosed the two recorded
AmSouth mortgages but no satisfactions of them.419 Chicago Title excepted
the two mortgages from coverage, pending receipt of the cancelled mortgage
notes and satisfactions.420 New Millennial's closing agent telephoned Am-
South and was told by an unidentified employee that the two mortgages had
been paid off and written confirmation would follow. 42' The "written con-
firmation" was a faxed form from AmSouth titled "Installment Loan Ac-
count Profile" which showed a loan "close date" of June 30, 2004 and a zero
balance.422 The Installment Loan Profile also stated "PD OFF., 423 The sale
dence" of a decline in market value between the time of the recording of the lis pendens and
the lifting of the lis pendens is required. Haven Ctr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167 (citing Haisfield
v. ACP Fla. Holdings, Inc., 629 So. 2d 963, 965-66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). The Third
District, relying on Haisfield, also referred to "lost opportunities for a sale above a later mar-
ket value." id. This was not mentioned as a ground for recovering damages against a lis
pendens bond in Levin, where the Third District Court of Appeal also relied on Haisfield. See
supra text accompanying note 388.
411. Haven Ctr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167.
412. Id. Since this real property litigation was not based on a "duly recorded instrument,"
nor was "a statutory mechanics lien" involved, the lis pendens here was governed by the law
governing injunctions. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (2005)).
413. 6 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
414. Id. at 683.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 683.
419. Id.
420. Id. (alteration in original).
421. Id.
422. Id.
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was completed, and JP Morgan, as the assignee of the mortgages, began fo-
reclosure proceedings. 424 New Millennial and Branch Banking & Trust ar-
gued that the mortgages held by JP Morgan were unenforceable because JP
Morgan had failed to record the assignments to them pursuant to section
701.02 of the Florida Statutes. 425 The trial court agreed and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of New Millennial and Branch Banking & Trust. 426
The trial court also found that New Millennial was a subsequent purchaser
for value without notice of the assignments of the mortgages to JP Morgan,
and that Branch Banking & Trust was a subsequent creditor for value with-
out notice of the assignments of the mortgages.427 The Second District Court
of Appeal reversed.428 Noting that this was an issue of first impression, the
Second District held that section 701.02 of the Florida Statutes was misap-
plied by the trial court.429 This section does not operate to invalidate a mort-
gage. 430 Rather, it establishes the rights of competing mortgage assignees
and purchasers.431 In the example given by the court, "if the original mortga-
gee assign[ed] the mortgage to Entity A and Entity A fails to record that as-
signment, Entity A cannot claim priority over a latter assignee of the same
mortgage (Entity B). 432 The Second District determined that New Millenni-
al and Branch Banking & Trust could not be without notice of the mortgages
because the mortgages were a matter of public record.433 The Second District
also noted that the closing agent could have made written demand on Am-
South for a mortgage estoppel letter pursuant to section 701.04 of the Florida
Statutes.434 This would have uncovered the fact that the mortgages were out-
standing.435 Mr. Jahren did not claim otherwise.436 The Installment Loan
Profile sent in response to the closing agent's oral inquiry is not an estoppel
letter.437 In addition, New Millennial could not be a purchaser in good faith
because someone claiming under the mortgagor is not intended to be covered
423. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 683.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 682-83.
428. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 688.
429. Id. at 684-85.
430. See id. at 685.
431. Id. (citing Kapila v. At. Mortgage & Inv. Corp. (In re Halabi), 184 F.3d 1335, 1338
(I 1th Cir. 1999)).
432. Id.
433. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 686.
434. Id. at 687.
435. See id.
436. See id.
437. Id. at 687-88.
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by section 701.02.438 The Second District Court of Appeal said that "[w]e
agree with . . .In re Halabi because its interpretation of the statute makes
sense."
439
V111. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Computation of Business Damages
The Supreme Court of Florida, in System Components Corp. v. Florida
Department of Transportation,44° affirmed the decision of the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, 44 thereby resolving a conflict between the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in this case and the Fourth District Court of Appeal in De-
partment of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC.442 In System Components
Corp., the Florida Department of Transportation took by eminent domain, a
part of the property owned by System Components Corporation (Corpora-
tion) that ran right through the middle of the property in order to widen a
road." 3 Corporation relocated and continued its business."4  Corporation
was entitled to business damages resulting from the taking, and the jury, us-
ing an income valuation approach, determined gross business damages in the
amount of $2,394,964.445  The jury calculated net business damages at
$1,347,911 which was the amount of the award to Corporation. 446 In reach-
ing the $1,347,91 1 figure, the jury took into consideration the fact that Cor-
poration continued its business.44  Corporation appealed the verdict, relying
on the Department of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC decision.448 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal there determined that business damages
called for by section 73.071(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes must be determined
without reduction or mitigation by reason of the property owner's relocation
438. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 685-86 (citing Kapila v. Atil. Mortgage & Inv. Corp.
(In re Halabi), 184 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999)).
439. Id. at 685.
440. 14 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 2009).
441. Id. at 985; Sys. Components Corp. v. Dep't of Transp. (Sys. Components Corp. I),
985 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g granted, 990 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.
2008).
442. 895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra
note 120, at 109-10.
443. Sys. Components Corp. II, 14 So. 3d at 971.
444. Id. at 972-73.
445. Id. at 974.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Sys. Components Corp. 1H, 14 So. 3d at 974.
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and continuation of the business being valued. 449 That is, business damages
would be determined as though the business ceased to exist on the date of the
eminent domain taking.450 The Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed with
the Fourth District, and certified conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida.45'
The Supreme Court provided a brief history of eminent domain proceedings
in Florida pointedly noting that compensating a property owner for the taking
of real estate is constitutionally required, but that is not so with respect to
providing compensation to the owner for lost business profits.452 The Court
also noted that while severance damages reimburse the property owner for
the reduction in value that the eminent domain taking causes to any remain-
ing land of the property owner, business damages compensate the owner for
probable reductions in business value, business losses, and increased busi-
ness expenses caused by the taking.453 Lost profits and business opportuni-
ties are intangible assets, not real property.454 Business damage awards are
"a matter of legislative grace, 'A55 unless the government takes the business
itself in which case compensation is required.456 Business damage provi-
sions are to be narrowly construed and are available only if:
a partial taking occurs; the condemnor is a state or local "public
body;" the land is taken to construct ... a right-of-way; the taking
damages or destroys an established business, which has existed on
the parent tract for [five years]; the business owner owns the con-
demned and adjoining land .. . ; business was conducted on the
condemned land and the adjoining remainder; and the [property
owner] specifically pleads and proves [all of the foregoing ele-
ments] .457
The Court concluded that adopting the Fourth District's reasoning
would provide an undeserved windfall to the business owner who relocates
449. See id.
450. Id. at 975.
451. See id.
452. Id. at 975-76.
453. Sys. Components Corp. 11, 14 So. 3d at 976-77.
454. Id. at 976 (quoting Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Fort Lauderdale, 322 So.
2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1975)).
455. Id. (quoting Jamesson, 322 So. 2d at 511).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 978 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b)(2009)). The five year requirement ap-
plies for takings on or after January 1, 2005. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b). For takings before
January 1, 2005, the required period was four years. Id.
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and continues in business.458 However, the Court refused to impose an af-
firmative duty on a property owner to reduce damages by relocating and con-
tinuing business.45 9 That, it said, was the province of the legislature.4 °
B. Public Purpose and Reasonable Necessity
The City of Lakeland (the City), located in Polk County (the County),
took property by eminent domain for a right-of-way that would allow for a
road extension. 46' The property that was subject to the trial court's orders of
taking was County-not City-property, and the property was not "conti-
guous to the City's boundaries. 462 The road project, however, was only a
short distance east of an area undergoing development that was within the
City's boundaries.4 63 The property owners appealed, and the Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the eminent domain power of the State
of Florida was delegated to the City not only in the City's charter, but also by
section 166.411(3) of the Florida Statutes.464 The Second District concluded
that the delegation was broad enough to allow a taking outside the City
boundary.465 The appellate court noted that in Prosser v. Polk County,466
where Hillsborough County did not object, Polk County was allowed to take
land in adjacent Hillsborough County.467 Similarly, here, there was no objec-
tion by the County to the City's taking of County land.468 The appellate court
observed that the City also relied on a 2003 interlocal agreement with the
County that recognized the need for the road project, and the County had
agreed to finance part of the project.469 In light of this agreement, the appel-
late court found that the City had met its burden of demonstrating "a public
purpose and a reasonable necessity," and it was not necessary that the City
458. Sys. Components Corp. 11, 14 So. 3d at 981 (citing Sys. Components Corp. v. Dep't
of Transp. (Sys. Components Corp. 1), 985 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
reh'g granted, 990 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2008)).
459. Id. at 985.
460. Id.
461. Kirkland v. City of Lakeland, 3 So. 3d 398, 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 400.
465. Id.
466. 545 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
467. Kirkland, 3 So. 3d at 400 (citing Prosser, 545 So. 2d at 934).
468. Id.
469. Id. Part of the funding was provided by the Florida Department of Transportation,
with the City and the County agreeing to split the balance of the cost. Id.
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demonstrate "a public purpose that was exclusively or even primarily a mu-
nicipal purpose of the City" rather than both entities.470
C. Inverse Condemnation
In Drake v. Walton County,471 the property owners bought their Walton
County (the County) property in 1992.472 Before then, the upper part of the
property had been subjected to an overflow of water from Oyster Lake.473
The outflow was stabilized in 1988 with assistance from the State.4 74 There
was no overflow of water across this part of the property after the stabiliza-
tion, at least not until 1995.475 Thus, after the stabilization, this part of the
property could be developed, and it was during this period that the property
owners purchased the property.4 76 However, in 1995, following a hurricane,
the County diverted lake water across the property.477 Between 1996 and
1999, the County tried unsuccessfully to assist in directing the lake water
overflow away from the property.478 The overflow was stopped in 2004, but
in 2005, under emergency conditions, the County again diverted overflow
water across the upper section of the property.479 This was done "to protect a
neighbor's home and property. 480 The property owner brought an action
against the County for inverse condemnation. 48' The trial court found that
the County had merely restored the natural drainage pattern and was res-
ponding to emergency conditions pursuant to section 252.43(6) of the Flori-
da Statutes.482 The First District Court of Appeal reversed.48 3 In ruling for
the property owners, the First District found that the "critical undisputed
fact" was that four years before the 1992 purchase of the property by proper-
ty owners, overflow had been stabilized-with the help of the State of Flori-
470. Id.
471. 6 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
472. Id. at 719.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. id.
476. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 719.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 719. There were claims for trespass and negligence as well. Id. at
719 n. I. The property owners appealed the trial court's ruling in favor of the County on these
claims, and the First District affirmed the trial court. Id. at 719, 722.
482. Id. at 719-20.
483. Id. at 722.
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da-and was no longer crossing the property.484 The overflow drainage onto
the property resulted from the County's actions in 1995 and 2005.485 The
hurricane and other emergencies did not flood the property.486 It was "the
County's action in response to the hurricane that caused the flooding" on the
property.487 The property owners "could reasonably rely on the drainage
pattern" set in 1988.488 When the pattern was changed by the County, there
was a taking.489 Even if the County acted in the face of an emergency pur-
suant to section 252.43(6) of the Florida Statutes, that does not prevent the
successful prosecution of an inverse condemnation proceeding.49° Judge
Barfield dissented.49' According to the dissent, the facts were distinguishable
from the cases cited by the majority, and the majority never explained how
the County's actions "somehow resulted in a 'taking' of the subject proper-
ty. '492 Judge Barfield said that "[t]o allow the plaintiff to recover" from the
County based on the facts presented "is, in my opinion, a travesty of justice
and a clear departure from well-settled law. 493
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Non-Compete Agreements
In Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Interstate Chemical, Inc.,4 9 the em-
ployment contract between Robert Hutchens (Former Employee) and Fiber-
glass Coatings, Inc. (Former Employer) contained a non-compete clause.495
Former Employee, a salesperson for Former Employer, was prohibited by the
non-compete clause from working in Florida for a competitor of Former Em-
ployer during the one year following the end of his employment, which em-
ployment ended in March 2002.496 Within weeks after leaving the employ of
484. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 720.
485. See id. at719.
486. Id. at 720.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 720 (citing Schick v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 1320
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987)); see also Martin v. City of Monticello, 632 So. 2d 236, 237
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Leon County v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
490. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 721-22.
491. Id. at 722 (Barfield, J., dissenting).
492. id. at 725.
493. Id.
494. 16 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
495. Id. at 837.
496. ld.
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Former Employer, Former Employee went to work for a short time for Po-
lymeric, a fiberglass competitor.49 ' Then, in September 2002, Former Em-
ployee went to work as a salesperson for Interstate Chemical, Inc. (New Em-
ployer), another competitor of Former Employer.498 In January 2004, Former
Employer sued New Employer alleging that New Employer had "tortiously
interfered with the restrictive covenant. '499 Former Employer asserted two
theories for the interference: "a 'solicitation of customers' theory and an
'employment' theory." 5°° The trial court granted New Employer's motion
for summary judgment, agreeing with New Employer's argument that, as a
matter of law, New Employer could not be liable for inducing or causing
Former Employee's breach because Former Employee "was predisposed to
breach" the non-compete clause, as demonstrated by Former Employee's
previous employment for Polymeric.50 1 Former Employer appealed.50 2 The
Second District affirmed on the "employment" theory. 503 In order to estab-
lish liability for tortious interference on this theory, it is necessary to estab-
lish causation.'°4 In order to establish causation, Former Employer would
have had to show that New Employer "'intended to procure a breach of the
contract."'5 5 Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as quoted by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Martin Petroleum Corp. v. Amerada
Hess Corp.,506 the Second District concluded that the mere hiring of Former
Employee during the non-compete period did not amount to tortious interfe-
rence. 507 This would have been so even if the new employment agreement
was entered into with New Employer's knowledge that Former Employee
could not work for New Employer and, at the same time, honor his promise
not to compete with Former Employer. 50 8 However, it was not appropriate to
grant summary judgment in favor of New Employer on the "solicitation of
customers" theory of tortious interference. 5' There was "direct and circums-
tantial evidence" in the record that could result in findings of fact by which
497. Id.
498. Id. at 837-38.
499. Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 16 So. 3d at 838.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 16 So. 3d at 838.
505. Id. (quoting Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Fla., 832 So. 2d 810,
814 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
506. 769 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
507. See Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 16 So. 3d at 838 (citing Martin Petroleum Corp., 769
So. 2d at 1107).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 839.
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New Employer could be held liable for tortious interference on the "solicita-
tion of customers" theory.51°
B. Enjoining Violation of Non-Compete Agreement: Ex Parte Order
Mr. Bookall (Former Employee), who had signed a covenant not to
compete with Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. (Former Employer), resigned and went to
work for a competitor (New Employer).51' After finding out about Former
Employee's new job, Former Employer advised Former Employee that it
considered his actions a breach of the agreement.5 2 Former Employee did
not terminate his new employment, despite written assurances from Former
Employee's lawyer that there would be compliance with the non-compete
agreement.5 3 Former Employer proceeded ex parte to obtain a temporary
injunction against Former Employee and New Employer.1 4 The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order that granted the request
for an injunction.515 The trial court's order was insufficient because it did not
comply with all the requirements of rule 1.610(a) of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure."6 Before an ex parte temporary injunction may be issued,
the rule requires that the moving party allege specific facts showing irrepara-
ble and immediate injury absent the injunction, and that the movant's attor-
ney provide a written certification as to the reasons for not requiring no-
tice.5" 7 The trial court's order granting the injunction must state what the
injury would be, explain why it "may be irreparable," and list the reasons for
not having required notice.518 The trial court's order was defective in failing
to state those reasons." 9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal cited the
Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Lewis v. Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc. 520 and the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Soud v. Kendale,
Inc.521 when it stated that this omission would not have invalidated the order
510. Id.
511. Bookall v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 995 So. 2d 1116, 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 1118.
516. Bookall, 995 So. 2d at 1117.
517. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1)-(2)). If notice was attempted, the attorney must
certify what the efforts were to give notice. Id.
518. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(2)).
519. Id.; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(2).
520. 949 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
521. 788 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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had the complaint or motion explained why the order should be entered
without notice, as this would have substituted for the statement in the or-
der.522 Former Employer did not do so.
523
C. Employment Discrimination
Ms. Carsillo (Employee) was a firefighter/paramedic employed by
the City of Lake Worth (City).524 When Employee became pregnant, she
requested a light duty assignment. 25 Although she requested to be assigned
to the fire department, she was assigned elsewhere.526 She objected, but ul-
timately she proceeded with the light duty assignments in those other de-
partments.527 Employee sued the City under the Florida Civil Rights Act
(FCRA), sections 760.01-.10 of the Florida Statutes, claiming discrimina-
tion.528 Her allegation of discrimination was based on light duty assignments
at the fire department for other employees who had "physical restrictions."5 29
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City concluding
that the FCRA does not address "discrimination based on pregnancy," al-
though it covers discrimination based on sex.530 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that discrimination based on pregnancy is sex dis-
crimination.531 The appellate court said that "if a Florida statute is patterned
after a federal law, the Florida statute will be given the same construction as
the federal courts give the federal act., 532 The court then noted that the pro-
vision at issue in the FCRA was "identical to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended., 533 The pertinent "identical" provision of the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as quoted by the appellate court, does not, as Florida does not,
list pregnancy. 5 34 However, that provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
522. Bookall, 995 So. 2d at 1118; see Lewis, 949 So. 2d at 1115; Soud, 788 So. 2d at 1053.
523. Bookall, 995 So. 2d at 1118.
524. Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth, 995 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1119.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 1119,1121.
532. Id. at 1119 (citing State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1995)).
533. Id.
534. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1119. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 was said to
have been a legislative response to the five-four decision of the United States Supreme Court
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429, U.S. 125, 125-126 (1976), where the Court held that
an employer did not violate the federal Civil Rights Act even though its disability insurance
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was amended by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
to include employment discrimination based on pregnancy as prohibited dis-
crimination based on sex.535 The FCRA, however, has not been amended.536
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, after reviewing the federal pre-emption
analysis as applied by the First District Court of Appeal in O'Loughlin v.
Pinchback,537 as well as federal court decisions where relief has been
sought-and denied-under the FCRA, concluded that the appellate court
was required to consider the later amendment of the federal law. 53 8 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal "'had the right and the duty, in arriving at
the correct meaning of a prior statute, to consider subsequent legislation,"'
and held that under the FCRA, sex discrimination includes discrimination
based on pregnancy.
539
X. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The next case, Attorney's Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. M. I. Industries
USA, Inc. (M.I. Industries USA, Inc. I1),540 is a case to watch, as the Supreme
Court of Florida has accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in M.L Industries U.S.A, Inc. v. Attorneys'
Title Insurance Fund, Inc. (M.I. Industries USA, Inc. /).51' Attorneys' Title
Insurance Fund, Inc. (the Fund) obtained an ex parte order enjoining M.I.
Industries USA, Inc. (M.I. Industries) from transferring or withdrawing funds
from its bank accounts and from disposing of other assets.542 The underlying
allegations were that M.I. Industries was involved in illegal real estate
schemes, and that profits from these land schemes were moved through a
did not provide coverage for disability that arose from pregnancy. Id. at 125. (citing Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983) (overruling Gil-
bert)).
535. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1119.
536. Id. at 1120.
537. 579 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In O'Loughlin, a pregnancy discrimi-
nation suit seeking back pay, the First District Court of Appeal held that where Florida law
provides "less protection to its citizens than does the corresponding federal law," so that Flor-
ida law is "'an obstacle to the accomplishment"' of the objectives of the U.S. Congress, the
Florida statute will be deemed pre-empted by the federal statute to that extent. Id. at 792
(citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987)).
538. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1120-21.
539. Id. (quoting Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla., 59 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1952)).
540. 10 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2009) (unpublished table decision).
541. 6 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), cert. granted, 10 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2009)
(unpublished table decision).
542. Id. at 628.
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member-agent's attorney trust fund to the M.I. accounts.543 The trial judge
denied the request of M.I. Industries for dissolution of the injunction, al-
though some assets were released from the injunction. 44 M.I. Industries
appealed and the Fund cross-appealed as to the release of those assets and an
increase of the injunction bond amount.545 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal held that the general rule is that, in an action for damages, it is improper
to issue an injunction freezing a bank account since damages will suffice,
even if the money in the account is lost.546 The appellate court noted that the
fact that money damages may be uncollectible does not change the result.
547
However, the appellate court acknowledged that there is an exception when
the injunction serves "to protect the res of a trust" while litigation is pend-
548 hing. Thus, had the alleged profits from the scheme "remained specifically
identifiable in the member-agent's attorney's trust account, then the injunc-
tion may have been proper. 5 49 The Fourth District Court of Appeal said that
because "the Fund expressly sought damages in its complaint ... for unjust
enrichment," money damages would be sufficient to compensate the Fund.55 °
The Fourth District concluded that it was "improper to enter an injunction
preventing a party from using or disposing of its assets prior to the conclu-
sion of a legal action. 551
While the appellate court did not, in its original opinion, specifically
state that the Fund's unjust enrichment claim was not an equitable action, it
did appear to conclude that the Fund's action was a legal action for which
there was an adequate remedy at law.552 On the Fund's motion for rehearing,
which the Fourth District Court denied, the Fund asserted that the Fourth
District Court of Appeal had previously recognized the claim of unjust
enrichment "in causes of action based in law and equity. ' 53 The Fourth Dis-
trict disagreed stating, "[t]o the contrary, this court has squarely held that an
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. M.I. Indus. USA, Inc. I, 6 So. 3d at 628-29 (citing Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed'n, Inc.,
498 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
547. Id. at 629 (citing Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (per curiam)).
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. M.L Indus. USA, Inc. 1, 6 So. 3d at 629 (emphasis added) (citing Bricefio v. Bryden
Invs., Ltd., 973 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
552. See id.
553. Id.
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action for unjust enrichment is an action at law., 554 The court, however, rec-
ognized that this position, including "the current definition of 'no adequate
remedy at law,' can result in an injustice in a case such as this one, ' 555 citing
the concurring opinion in the decision of another panel of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Weinstein v. Aisenberg.5 6
The court then went on to certify the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida as one of great public importance,
INCIDENT TO AN ACTION AT LAW, MAY A TRIAL COURT
ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO FREEZE ASSETS OF A
DEFENDANT, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF HAS DEMON-
STRATED: (1) [THAT] DEFENDANT WILL TRANSFER, DIS-
SIPATE, OR HIDE HIS/HER ASSETS SO AS TO RENDER A
TRIAL JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABLE; (2) A CLEAR
LEGAL RIGHT TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED; (3) A
SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE ME-
RITS; AND (4) A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION WILL SERVE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
557
Although not expressly asked to do so, perhaps the Court will take this
opportunity to clarify the nature of an action alleging unjust enrichment5 8 as
there appears to be some difference of opinion 9.5 " For example, in Brace v.
Comfort, discussed earlier in this article,560 the Second District Court of Ap-
peal characterized a claim of unjust enrichment as an equitable claim. 561
554. Id. (citing Commerce P'ship 8098 Ltd. P'ship v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d
383, 386-87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
555. Id. (citing Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705, 711-12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (Gross, J., concurring)).
556. 758 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
557. M.L Indus. USA, Inc., 6 So. 3d at 629.
558. See, for example, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp where the Court was asked to deter-
mine whether Florida recognized the tort of false light invasion of privacy. 997 So. 2d 1098,
1100 (Fla. 2008). After answering no to the certified question, the Court went on to address
the defamation rule under section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id.; see also
Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 129-30.
559. See Brace v. Comfort, 2 So. 3d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
560. See supra text accompanying notes 312-26.
561. Brace, 2 So. 3dat 1011.
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XI. JURISDICTION, VENUE, FORUM NON CONVENIENS, AND STANDING
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Conferred by Contract
In Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec North America, Inc. ,562 the Third
District Court of Appeal was called upon to determine, as "an issue of first
impression," if the parties' consent to a contract provision could, in and of
itself, confer jurisdiction on a Florida court over two Delaware limited liabil-
ity companies under sections 685.101 and 685.102 of the Florida Statutes.56 3
MasTec North America, Inc. (Florida Corporation) contracted with Jetbroad-
band WV, LLC and Jetbroadband VA, LLC (Delaware LLCs) to perform
certain services for Delaware LLCs in Virginia.564 Delaware LLCs had their
principal places of business in New York.565 The contract clause at issue
provided that the parties "irrevocably agree and submit to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami. 566 The
clause also contained a choice of law provision, choosing Florida law as the
governing law. 567 A disagreement between the parties led Florida Corpora-
tion to sue Delaware LLCs in Miami-Dade County. 568 Delaware LLCs took
the position that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over them,
but the trial court disagreed, and their motion to dismiss was denied.569 The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court.5 70 The appellate court
acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Florida, in McRae v. J.D./M.D.,
Inc.,5 7 held that an agreement alone is not enough to "confer personal juris-
diction on Florida courts. 572 However, the Supreme Court of Florida's
McRae decision in 1987 was rendered in the context of section 48.193 of the
Florida Statutes, Florida's traditional basis for long-arm statute jurisdic-
tion.573 Two years later, however, sections 685.101 and 685.102 of the Flor-
ida Statutes were enacted.5"4 These provisions of the Contract Enforcement
Chapter of the Commercial Relations Title are entitled "Choice of Law" and
562. 13 So. 3d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
563. Id. at 160.
564. Id. at 160-61.
565. Id. at 161 n.1.
566. Id. at 161.
567. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 163.
571. 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987).
572. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161 (citing McRae, 511 So. 2d at 542).
573. Id. (quoting McRae, 511 So. 2d at 543); see FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2009).
574. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161.
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"Jurisdiction," respectively.575 Under these sections, personal jurisdiction
can be conferred on Florida courts by a contract provision, provided several
requirements are satisfied.5 76  The agreement at issue must contain both a
Florida choice of law clause, pursuant to section 685.101 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, and a clause by which the non-resident agrees to submit to the Florida
court's jurisdiction.577 In addition, the agreement must involve consideration
in the aggregate amount of at least $250,000; and then, if bringing the action
in Florida is not in violation of the United States Constitution and "'bears a
substantial or reasonable relation to Florida, or ... at least one of the parties
is either a resident or citizen of Florida ... or is incorporated or organized
under the laws of Florida"' the parties can, by the provision, confer jurisdic-
tion on the Florida court. 578  The facts of this case satisfied the five part
test.5 79 The Third District Court of Appeal also observed that while the due
process minimum contacts with the forum state test-the "not in violation of
the United States Constitution" part of the test-must be met "in the com-
mercial context," the choice of law clause itself satisfies the due process min-
imum contacts requirement, provided it "is 'freely negotiated' and is not
'unreasonable and unjust.' 580
B. Personal Jurisdiction: Contracts Cases and Burden of Proof
Club & Community Corporation (Florida Corporation) sued Hampton
Island Preservation, LLC (Georgia LLC) in the Palm Beach County Circuit
Court for breach of contract.581 After Georgia LLC's motions to dismiss
Florida Corporation's complaint and first amended complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute were granted by the
575. Id. at 161-62; see FLA. STAT. §§ 685.101-.102 (2009).
576. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161-62. The court broke these down into five
requirements and numbered them accordingly. Id. at 162.
577. Id.
578. Id. at 161-62 (quoting Edward M. Mullins & Douglas J. Giuliano, Contractual Waiv-
er of Personal Jurisdiction Under F.S. § 685.102: The Long-Arm Statute's Little-Known
Cousin, 80 FLA. B.J. 36, 36-37 (May 2006)).
579. Id. at 163.
580. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 163 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)); see also Desai Patel Sharma, Ltd. v. Don Bell Indus., Inc.,
729 So. 2d 453,454 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
581. Hampton Island Pres., LLC v. Club & Cmty. Corp., 998 So. 2d 665, 666-67 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009). There was also a claim based on quantum meruit, a claim alleging un-
just enrichment, and a claim of gross negligence. Id. at 667. The portion of the Florida long-
arm statute that is based on tortious conduct occurring in the state, section 48.193 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, was not mentioned in the court's opinion.
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trial court, Florida Corporation filed a second amended complaint.582 Geor-
gia LLC again filed a motion to dismiss, but this time the trial court denied
the motion.583 Georgia LLC appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal reversed. 584 Although the appellate court discussed the two-part test of
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,5 85 its decision focused on burden of
proof.586 A defendant must file affidavits in support of its motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. 87 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff who
must file "opposing affidavits or other evidence. 588 With respect to the first
statutory prong of the Venetian Salami Co. test, the Fourth District noted that
Florida Corporation alleged in its second amended complaint that under the
parties' agreement, "all payments were required to be made and were made
in Palm Beach County. 5 89 Florida, as the place of payment with respect to a
contract with a Florida resident, has previously been recognized by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal as a sufficient jurisdictional fact.5 90 There
was no opposing affidavit filed by Georgia LLC to contest this allegation. 59'
However, as to minimum contacts, the second prong of the Venetian Salami
Co. test, Florida Corporation relied on an unsigned copy of an "Agreement
for Professional Services", which contained a forum selection clause stating
that the Agreement was governed by the laws of Florida.5 92 Georgia LLC
filed an affidavit of its manager, who stated that he had no knowledge of the
Agreement for Professional Services ever having been signed by "any autho-
rized representative" of Georgia LLC.593 No opposing affidavit was filed by
Florida Corporation.594 Thus, the defendant submitted an affidavit contesting
582. Id. at 666.
583. Id. at 667.
584. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 668.
585. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989). The two part test includes the question of whether first,
there are sufficient jurisdictional facts alleged for purposes of section 48.193(1)(g) of the
Florida Statutes. See id. at 502. If the answer is yes, the second part examines the due
process requirement that the defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida. Id.
586. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 667.
587. Id.
588. Id. (citing Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
589. Id.
590. Id. at 668 (quoting Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d 268, 270
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Woodard concluded
that under the second prong of the Venetian test, there were not sufficient minimum contacts
to justify Woodard being haled into the Florida courts. Woodard, 949 So. 2d at 270; see Bar-
bara Landau, 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32 NOVA L. REV.
21, 86-87 (2007) [hereinafter Landau, 2006-2007 Survey].
591. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 668.
592. Id. at 667.
593. Id. at 668.
594. Id.
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minimum contacts, but the plaintiff did not submit the required opposing
affidavit to establish minimum contacts. 595 The appellate court did note, in
dicta, that under McRae, even if the Agreement for Professional Services had
been signed, "'a forum selection clause, designating Florida as the forum,
cannot operate as the sole basis for Florida to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an objecting non-resident defendant.' ' 596
In light of the Third District Court of Appeal's ruling on the minimum
contacts issue in its Jetbroadband decision, albeit a decision under sections
685.101 and 685.102, rather than section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, and
the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Desai Patel Sharma, Ltd. v.
Don Bell Industries, Inc.,5 cited in Jetbroadband, it appears that there is a
question as to whether, in the context of section 48.193, a signed jurisdiction
agreement can ever meet the minimum contacts constitutional prong under
Venetian Salami Co., or whether it only did so under section 685.102 when
considered together with the other requirements of that section. 598
C. Personal Jurisdiction: Corporate Shield Doctrine
Mr. Rensin (Nonresident) was the CEO of a Maryland and a Virginia
limited liability company (LLCs).5 99 The LLCs and Nonresident, individual-
ly, were sued by the Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Florida
(State) for alleged violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act and its Retail Installment Sales Act.6°° These claims arose out of
the sale of electronics, including computers, to Florida customers.60 ' The
State claimed personal jurisdiction over Mr. Rensin, individually, under Flor-
ida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, and the trial
595. See id.
596. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 668 (quoting McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc.,
511 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1987)).
597. 729 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
598. See Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 13 So. 3d 159, 162 n.3 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The exact language of the forum selection clause is not set forth in the
appellate court's decision in Hampton Island, which may very well have been because the
clause was contained in a copy of an unsigned agreement. See Hampton Island Pres., LLC,
998 So. 2d at 667. However, if the agreement had been signed, then the determination of what
type of clause it was may have been crucial. See id. Was it a forum selection clause, a choice
of law provision, or both, and did the provision include an agreement to submit to Florida's
jurisdiction?
599. Rensin v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D402, D402 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009).
600. Id. The corporations were also defendants, but this appeal only addressed Nonresi-
dent's motion to dismiss. See id.
601. Id.
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court agreed.62 Nonresident appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal
reversed.6°3 Florida adopted the corporate shield doctrine in Doe v. Thomp-
son,6W4 which says that the "'acts of [a] corporate employee performed in
[his] corporate capacity do not form the basis for jurisdiction over [the] cor-
porate employee in his individual capacity. '" '6° At this point in its opinion,
in a footnote, the First District Court of Appeal confirmed that this doctrine
applies in the context of limited liability companies. 6°6 Further, the appellate
court held that "'it is unfair to force an individual to defend a suit brought
against him personally in a forum with which his only relevant contacts are
acts performed not for his own benefit but for the benefit of his employ-
er.' '607 An exception to the corporate shield doctrine exists in cases where
the employee is accused of "'fraud or other intentional misconduct"' directed
to Florida residents.6°8 The First District Court of Appeal reversed because
the State had not met its burden of proof as set forth in Venetian Salami Co.
v. Parthenais.°9 Nonresident filed an affidavit to the effect "that he, perso-
nally, had no Florida contacts and was not a primary participant in any inten-
tional tortious contacts expressly aimed at Florida.' '610 It was then up to the
State to file counter-affidavits to establish personal jurisdiction, but the State
failed to do so. 611 In addition, on Nonresident's motion for clarification, the
First District Court of Appeal said that the State could not now hold an evi-
dentiary hearing in the trial court, since no affidavit was submitted by the
State, and the appellate court clarified its earlier order to direct that the trial
court dismiss the action as to Nonresident.612
D. Personal Jurisdiction: Tort Case
The next case is another long-arm statute case, but this one is a tort ac-
63tion. '3 Beta (Florida LLCs) hired Mintz & Fraade, P.C., a New York pro-
602. See id.
603. Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D402.
604. 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1993).
605. Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D402 (quoting Thompson, 620 So. 2d at 1006) (altera-
tion in original).
606. See id. at D403 n.1 (citing Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Co., LLC, 821 So.
2d 1183, 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
607. Id. at D402 (quoting Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956, 959 (N.H. 1987)).
608. Id. (quoting Thompson, 620 So. 2d at 1006 n.I).
609. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989); see Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly. at D403.
610. Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D402.
611. See id. at D403.
612. See id.
613. See Beta Drywall Acquisition, LLC v. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 9 So. 3d 651 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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fessional corporation (NY Firm), to handle legal work involving the acquisi-
tion of the assets of Beta Drywall, a Florida corporation. 614 The legal work
was all done in New York, except for the closing.6 5 Florida LLCs sued NY
Firm for malpractice, alleging failure to prepare certain documents for the
newly created Florida LLCs, which resulted in disputes among the members
and a derivative action.616 The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over NY Firm.617 On appeal, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal discussed the two-part test under Wendt v. Horowitz,61 8 as interpreted
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Renaissance Health Publishing,
LLC v. Resveratrol Partners, LLC.6 19 With respect to the first prong of the
test, which requires that the court find the commission of a tort in Florida,
the court needs to consider the following rules in applying section
48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.620 "[A] cause of action for tort accrues
wherever plaintiff suffers damage to his property. '62 The defendant does
not have to be physically in Florida to commit a tort in Florida, nor does
there have to be "a physical tort" committed in Florida to be within the reach
of the long-arm statute.622 "[A] foreign defendant can commit a tort within
Florida via its electronic, telephonic, or written communications into" Flori-
da provided the cause of action for tort results from those communications. 62 3
As alleged, the tort of malpractice involved the claimed faulty formation of
and filing of faulty documents in Florida for the two Florida LLCs.624 The
entities could only have been formed by NY Firm sending communications
into Florida, that is, the filing of the documents in Florida.625 As to the
second prong of the Wendt test, the appellate court found that NY Firm's
activities also satisfied the due process minimum contacts requirement, con-
cluding that "[a] reasonable person having conducted the activities conducted
614. Id. at 652.
615. Id. The opinion does not state where the closing was held or who attended.
616. See id.
617. Beta, 9 So. 3d at 652.
618. 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002); see Beta, 9 So. 3d at 652.
619. 982 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see Beta, 9 So. 3d at 652; see also
Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 117 (discussing the Renaissance Health deci-
sion).
620. Beta, 9 So. 3d at 653 (citing Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
621. Id. (citing Becker, 841 So. 2d at 562).
622. See id.
623. Id.
624. See id. at 652.
625. See Beta, 9 So. 3d at 653.
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by [NY Firm] would reasonably foresee being haled into court in Florida
should an issue regarding the very formation of [Florida LLCs] arise. 626
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Lisa, S.A. (Plaintiff), a Panamanian corporation that owned shares in
Avicola, a Guatemalan corporation, sued other shareholders of Avicola (De-
fendants) in connection with Plaintiffs interests in the Guatemalan corpora-
62tion. 27 The trial court dismissed the second amended complaint, concluding
that Plaintiff had an "adequate alternative forum" in the Guatemalan
courts.628 With respect to Plaintiffs allegations that defendant shareholders
"stole" Plaintiffs "one-third share of [Avicola's] assets and profits" and
converted them to Florida situs assets, the Third District Court of Appeal
noted that there have been cases where jurisdiction has properly been re-
tained over a defendant's assets here for satisfaction of a final judgment that
might be obtained in a foreign jurisdiction.62 9 However, since Plaintiff was
not able to adequately trace the conversion of Guatemalan assets to Florida
assets, or demonstrate a connection between the Defendants' Florida assets
and the alleged wrongdoing of the Defendants, there was no justification for
the trial court in Florida to retain even limited local jurisdiction over Defen-
dants' Florida assets.63 ° However, that would not preclude future proceed-
ings in Florida under the rules of comity to satisfy a Guatemalan judgment
from Defendants' Florida property.631
F. Venue
In Koslow v. Sanders,632 Sanders sued Koslow for breach of contract,
instituting the action in Collier County where Sanders resided.633 Koslow's
motion to change venue to Broward County, where he resided, was denied
634by the court. Sanders claimed "that venue was proper in Collier County
where he resided because that is where any payments owed to him under the
contract would be due. 635 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and
626. Id. at 653.
627. Lisa, S.A. v. Gutierrez, 992 So. 2d 413,413 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
628. Id. at 414.
629. Id. at413-14.
630. See id. at415.
631. Id.
632. 4 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
633. Id. at 38.
634. Id.
635. Id.
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ordered the transfer of the action to Broward County.6 36 The Second District
acknowledged that venue is proper in the county where the creditor resides
when the contract does not state the place where payment is to be made, but
only if the amount of the payment is specified in the context of a "debtor-
creditor relationship" and the lawsuit is over an amount specified in the con-
tract.637 Sanders and Koslow were not in a debtor-creditor relationship.638
This was an accounting and declaratory judgment action arising out of an
alleged breach of contract, and the amount Koslow owed Sanders, if any, had
yet to be determined. 639 Therefore, the general breach of contract venue rule
applicable to performance contracts applied, that is, the place where the de-
faulting party fails to perform. 640 Koslow's breach of the contract, if it oc-
curred, would have been failure to perform administrative duties, and that
would have taken place in Broward County, where Koslow resided.64'
G. Standing
In Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. v. Citrus County, Florida,
642
the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners passed an ordinance that
amended its land development code allowing the Homosassa River Resort,
LLC to develop property it owned along the Homosassa River.643 The Coun-
ty was sued by Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. (the Alliance), Mr.
Bitter, Ms. Rendueles and Ms. Watkins (collectively referred to as Plain-
tiffs), who claimed that the ordinance violated the land development code.644
The "Alliance is a not-for-profit corporation 'committed to the preservation
and conservation of environmentally sensitive lands and the wildlife in and
around the Homosassa River and in Old Homosassa, Florida." '' '64 All of the
individual plaintiffs lived on property they owned in Citrus County, but none
owned property that was adjacent to the development site.646 And all of the
636. Id. at 39.
637. Koslow, 4 So. 3d at 38 (citing James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238
So. 2d 487, 487-89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
638. See id.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So. 2d 57, 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979)).
641. Id. at 39.
642. 2 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied, 16 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2009)
(unpublished table decision).
643. Id. at 331.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. See id. at 331, 339.
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individual plaintiffs expressed a general concern with and an interest in pre-
serving the environment so that they could continue to enjoy it in various
ways-for example, boating, fishing, bicycling, and walking.647 Plaintiffs
also cited increased demands on public services, such as water and roadways,
which would result from a larger population attracted by the development.
648
The trial court found that Plaintiffs' assertions about the development were
not sufficient allegations that they were adversely affected "in a way not
experienced by the general population." 649 Plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court on the ground that
Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.65 ° The Fifth District Court of Appeal re-
versed and remanded. 651 The appellate court began its analysis on standing
by stating the common law rule applicable before 1985, "that, in order to
have standing to challenge a land use decision, a party had to possess a legal-
ly recognized right that would be adversely affected by the decision or suffer
special damages different in kind from that suffered by the community as a
whole."652 In 1985, the legislature passed section 163.3215 of the Florida
Statutes, and according to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, "[t]here is no
doubt that the purpose of the adoption of section 163.3215 was to liberalize
standing in [the] context" of challenging land use decisions.653 The new and
more liberal standing rule only requires that the person complaining "must
allege that they have an interest that is something more than a 'general inter-
est in community well being."' 654 The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated
that "the case law assumes that an organization has an interest that is greater
than 'the general interest in community well being' when the organization's
primary purpose includes protecting the particular interest that they allege
will be adversely affected by the comprehensive plan violation., 655 Plain-
tiffs' allegations satisfied the new, more liberal standing requirements.
656
Judge Pleus dissented, saying that the majority's opinion regarding standing
647. Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., 2 So. 3d at 332-33.
648. Id. at 334.
649. Id. at 332.
650. Id.
651. Id. at 340. The appellate court also held that "Plaintiffs had not abused the privilege
to amend," and it, therefore, was error for the trial court to have dismissed Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint with prejudice. Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., 2 So. 3d at 340
n.l .
652. Id. at 336.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 337.
655. Id.
656. Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., 2 So. 3d at 340.
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is squarely opposed to the weight of authority.657 Judge Pleus found it espe-
cially troubling that the individual plaintiffs' Citrus County property was not
658adjacent to the development site. 8 Judge Pleus observed that "[e]very gadf-
ly with some amorphous environmental agenda, and enough money to pay a
filing fee, will be anointed with status simply because the gadfly wants to
'protect the planet."' 659 and he concluded his dissent by saying, "[flor those
who respect property rights, look Out!'66°
H. Domestication of Out-of-Country Foreign Money Judgment
In Israel v. Flick Mortgage Investors,66' Purchasers, who were Israeli
citizens, bought homes at a Florida golf resort, and Flick held mortgages on
the properties. 62 As it turned out, Purchasers paid substantially more for the
properties than the properties were worth, and they sued Flick and others, in
Israel, to "unwind" the sales. 663 Purchasers, as plaintiffs in the Israeli action,
served Flick in Florida with their complaint and did so using registered
mail. 664 Flick moved to dismiss the suit in Israel on the grounds of lack of
personal jurisdiction over him, and he filed a supporting affidavit.665 Flick's
attorney appeared in connection with the motion, but the Israeli court struck
the affidavit because Flick failed to appear.666 Ultimately, the motion to
dismiss was denied.667 Flick did not challenge the sufficiency of service of
process, and he did not subsequently participate in the action in Israel.66 8
After Purchasers obtained a judgment against Flick for almost $1,500,000,
Purchasers sought to domesticate the Israeli money judgment in Florida un-
der Florida's Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Act (the
Act), sections 55.601-.607 of the Florida Statutes.669 Flick successfully
moved for summary judgment in the Florida trial court on the ground of "in-
sufficiency of service of process in the Israeli action." 670  Purchasers ap-
657. Id. at 340-41 (Pleus, J., dissenting).
658. See id.
659. Id. at 346.
660. Id.
661. 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2732 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2008).
662. Id. at D2732.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Israel, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2732.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id.
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pealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.67' In
the Florida trial court, Flick failed to raise any defense to domestication that
was authorized by the Act. 672 The manner of how service of process is ef-
fected is not "one of the ten grounds for nonrecognition or nonenforceability
that may be asserted under the Act."673 Further, Flick waived the defense of
insufficient service of process by not raising it in the Israeli court when he
challenged personal jurisdiction there.674
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Execution Requirements
In Skylake Insurance Agency, Inc. v. NMB Plaza, LLC,675 NMB Plaza
(Landlord LLC) was constructing an office building when it entered into a
lease agreement with Skylake Insurance Agency, Inc. (Tenant).676 The lease
was signed by a member of Landlord LLC and by the president and a vice-
president of Tenant, on behalf of their respective entities. 677 The lease term
was for ten years to begin about three months after the building was com-
pleted.678 None of these signatures were witnessed.679 Prior to completion of
the building, Landlord LLC claimed that the lease was unenforceable against
it under the Florida Statute of Frauds, section 689.01 of the Florida Statutes,
because of the absence of witnesses. 68 Tenant sued Landlord LLC for spe-
cific performance. 681 The trial court granted summary judgment to Landlord
LLC.682 Tenant appealed and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed,
identifying and relying on sections 608.425(3) and 608.4235(3) of the Flori-
671. Israel, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2732.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2215 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2008), rev'd, No. 3D07-454,
2009 WL 3446494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009).
676. Id. at D2215.
677. Id.
678. Id.
679. Id.
680. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215. Tenant relied on the corpo-
rate exception at the end of section 689.01 of the Florida Statutes. Id. The appellate court
held that the corporate exception does not apply to a limited liability company. Id.
681. Id. Tenant also sought damages for fraud, and the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Landlord LLC on this claim as well. Id.
682. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215.
61
Landau: 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
da Statues.683 Section 608.425(3) validates the "disposition" of property by a
limited liability company if the documents are executed as provided in chap-
ter 608 of the Florida Statutes.6 84 Notably, the Third District held that a
lease is a "disposition of property., 685 The appellate court concluded that
since section 608.4235(3) grants limited liability company members, or man-
agers as the case may be, the authority to deal with the limited liability com-
pany's real estate by merely signing and delivering the appropriate instru-
ments, no witnesses were required.686
B. Landlord's Right to Writ of Possession
Kosoy Kendall Associates, LLC v. Los Latinos Restaurant, Inc.6 87 is a
short opinion that illustrates the draconian remedies available to a landlord
whose tenant is in default.688 The trial court held an adversarial hearing on
the default and refused to issue the landlord a writ of possession. 689 The
Third District Court of Appeal said that the adversarial hearing was unautho-
rized, and "[u]pon the lessee's failure to timely deposit a monthly rental
payment into the registry as required by court order under section 83.232,
Florida Statute[s], the petitioner-landlord was absolutely entitled to an ex
parte, immediate default for a writ of possession of the premises." 690 Te-
nant's payment, due February 1, 2009 and tendered February 5, 2009, was
too late. 691 Landlord's application for mandamus was granted.692
683. Id. In the absence of a provision to the contrary in an LLC's articles of organization
or in its operating agreement, a member can sign on behalf of a member-managed company,
and a manager is authorized to sign on behalf of a manager-managed LLC. See FLA. STAT. §
608.4235(3) (2009). There was no discussion in the opinion as to whether Landlord LLC was
member-managed or manager-managed or as to what the company's organization documents
may have provided, but the appellate court noted that the Landlord had admitted that it signed
the lease, and Landlord "raise[d] no claim that the ... signature was unauthorized." Skylake
Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215.
684. FLA. STAT. § 608.425(3).
685. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215.
686. See id.
687. 10 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
688. See id. at 1168.
689. Id.
690. Id. (footnote omitted).
691. Id. at 1168 n.l.
692. Kosoy Kendall Assocs., LLC, 10 So. 3d at 1169.
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XIII. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
In Jaylene, Inc. v. Moots, 693 Ms. Crisson (Principal) had given her pow-
er of attorney to Ms. Moots (Agent).694 Agent's authority included entering
"into binding contracts on [Principal's] behalf," and taking "any and all legal
steps necessary to collect any ... debt owed to [Principal], or to settle any
claim." 695 The general power of attorney also granted to the agent "full pow-
er and authority to act" on behalf of the principal.696 The general power of
attorney went on to say that "'[t]he listing of specific powers is not intended
to limit or restrict the general powers granted in this Power of Attorney in
any manner. ' '697 Acting under this power, Agent arranged for Principal to
live in a nursing home. 698 The agreement with the nursing home, signed by
Agent, contained an optional arbitration clause.699 The arbitration clause
could be eliminated by marking an "X" through it.7°° This was not done by
Agent.701 The arbitration clause provided that the Florida Arbitration Code
would apply to any claim or controversy arising from the agreement. 70 2 Af-
ter Principal died, Agent, as personal representative of Principal's estate,
brought a nursing home resident's rights lawsuit against the nursing home
and others.70 3 The nursing home's motion to compel arbitration under the
terms of the agreement was denied by the circuit court. 704 The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed. 705 The appellate court acknowledged that the
general power of attorney did not give the agent specific authority to consent
to arbitration.7 °6 Nevertheless, the appellate court found that the power of
attorney was "extremely broad and unambiguous," and Agent's authority
was virtually all-inclusive. 70 7 The Second District went on to say that, "[w]e
are not prepared to state that a grant of the authority to settle claims includes
the authority to consent to arbitration., 708 The Second District Court of Ap-
693. 995 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
694. Id. at 567.
695. Id. at 568.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. See Jaylene, Inc., 995 So. 2d at 567.
699. Id. at 567-68.
700. Id. at 568.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Jaylene, Inc., 995 So. 2d at 567.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 568.
707. Id.
708. Jaylene Inc., 995 So. 2d at 569.
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peal found, however, that "the specific grant of authority to settle claims in
the document under review in this case is consistent with the view that the
[power of attorney's] broad grant of authority includes the power to consent
to arbitration. ' '709 Agent relied on In re Estate of McKibbin v. Alterra Health
Care Corp.7 0 The In re Estate of McKibbin court-also the Second Dis-
trict-held in that case that the power of attorney there did not contain any-
thing that authorized the agent to enter into, on behalf of his principal, an
agreement to arbitrate.7 1' The Second District Court of Appeal concluded
that In re Estate of McKibbin was not controlling.712 The In re Estate of
McKibbin opinion did "not set forth the language of the power of attorney"
considered by the court to be deficient.1 3
About five weeks after the Second District Court of Appeal rendered its
opinion in Jaylene, Inc., the court decided Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa,
LLC v. Estate of Huerta.71 4 Ms. Huerta's daughter-in-law (Agent), under the
power of attorney given to her by Ms. Huerta, arranged for Ms. Huerta's
admission to a nursing home owned by Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa,
LLC (Sovereign). 1 5 The general power did not grant Agent specific authori-
ty to agree on Ms. Huerta's behalf to arbitration.716 Ms. Huerta died, and
Agent, as personal representative, sued Sovereign.717 Sovereign moved to
compel Agent to arbitrate these issues, but the trial court denied the motion,
relying on In re Estate of McKibbin.1 8 The Second District Court reversed,
stating that the trial court incorrectly relied on In re Estate of McKibbin in
denying Sovereign's motion. 7 9 Noting that it had addressed the limitations
of the In re Estate of McKibbin decision in Jaylene, Inc., the Second District
Court of Appeal found in this case that the general catch-all provision's grant
of authority contained in the power of attorney was sufficiently broad and
unambiguous enough to permit the agent's consent to arbitration on behalf of
the principal.7 20 This provision, when considered with several other provi-
sions of the power of attorney that granted the right to sign consents and re-
709. Id.
710. Id. (relying on 977 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008 (per curiam)).
711. In re Estate of McKibbin, 977 So. 2d at 613.
712. Jaylene, Inc., 995 So. 2d at 570.
713. Id. (citing Shaw v. Jain, 914 So. 2d 458,461 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
714. 14 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
715. Id. at 1034.
716. Id.
717. Id. The complaint alleged negligence, wrongful death, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Id.
718. Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1034.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 1035.
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leases, was sufficient to find that the agent had the authority to consent to
arbitration. 2 ' The court relied on its March 2009 decision in Carrington
Place of St. Pete, LLC v. Estate of Milo,722 and held that, "[w]hether a [power
of attorney] contains a provision that constitutes a sufficiently broad and
unambiguous grant of general authority ... requires examination of the lan-
guage of any catch-all provision contained in [the power of attorney], as well
as of the relationship of that language to the type" of authority specifically
granted.723
XlV. TAXES
A. Documentary Stamp Tax
Department of Revenue v. Pinellas VP, LLC724 involved two distinct sets
of transfers.725 With respect to the first transaction, Mr. Pridgen was the sole
member of Pinellas VP, LLC (Pinellas) and the sole shareholder and director
of Tarpon Ridge, Inc.726 Pinellas received twenty acres of land from Tarpon
Ridge, Inc. by warranty deed.727 Thus, Mr. Pridgen's solely owned corpora-
tion transferred real estate to his solely owned LLC.728 Although Pinellas
paid no money for the conveyance, it took the land subject to a mortgage. 729
Pinellas "paid a $19,250 documentary stamp tax based on the outstanding
[mortgage] balance. '730 The second transaction involved the transfer of real
estate from an LLC to its members.73 ' Tarpon Ridge, Inc. was the managing
and sole member of TPA Investments, LLC (TPA).732 TPA and Lindell-
Gandy LLC,7 33 in turn, were the members of Imperial, LLC7 3 4 Imperial, LLC
transferred real estate by warranty deed to its members, TPA and Lindell-
721. Id.
722. 34 Fla. L. Weekly D640 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2009).
723. Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1034.
724. 3 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Pilgrim Hall,
LLC, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D456 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2009) (per curiam).
725. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
726. Id.
727. Id.
728. See id.
729. Id.
730. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
731. Id.
732. Id.
733. Id. The opinion does not disclose who the members of Lindell-Gandy LLC are, but it
does say that Mr. Pridgen was not a member. See id.
734. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
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Gandy, as tenants in common. 735 TPA and Lindell-Gandy paid no money for
the real estate, but took it subject to a mortgage.736 Imperial, LLC had given
a promissory note securing the mortgage, and Mr. Pridgen guaranteed one-
half of Imperial's note.737 TPA recorded the deed and paid a documentary
stamp tax of $161,546.70 based on the principal amount of the mortgage.738
Pinellas and TPA then sued for refunds of the documentary stamp tax paid.739
The trial court granted their motions for summary judgment. 740 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed, distinguishing the facts of Crescent Miami
Center, LLC v. Florida Department of Revenue74' from the two situations
before it.7 41 In Crescent Miami Center, no money changed hands upon a
direct real estate transfer from a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary.743 In addition, there was no mortgage involved.7 " The Supreme
Court of Florida in Crescent Miami Center held that there was no taxable
event, no change of beneficial ownership, only a change in the form of own-
ership.745 In this case, there was consideration in the form of mortgages en-
cumbering the transferred property.74 Section 201.02(1) of the Florida Sta-
tutes specifically refers to mortgages as consideration upon which calculation
of the seventy cents per one hundred dollars of consideration is applied.747
The fact that Mr. Pridgen would bear the economic burden of the mortgages
was irrelevant. 748 There was a transfer between different legal entities for
consideration.749
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id.
738. Id.
739. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
740. Id. at 362-63.
741. 903 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2005).
742. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Pilgrim Hall, LLC,
34 Fla. L. Weekly D456, D456 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2009) (per curiam) (a case heard
with the Pinellas and TPA Investment cases).
743. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364 (citing Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC, 903 So. 3d at
914).
744. Id. (citing Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC, 903 So. 3d at 914).
745. Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC, 903 So. 3d at 918-19.
746. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364.
747. FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (2009); see also S.B. 2430, 2009 Leg., (Fla. 2009) (signed by
Gov. Crist on June 10, 2009, amending section 201.02(1) of the Florida Statutes, for statutory
limitations on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Miami Crescent Ctr., LLC).
748. See Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364.
749. Seeid.at361.
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B. Florida Tax on Real Estate Rental Payments
Section 212.03 1(l)(c) of the Florida Statutes imposes a six percent pri-
vilege tax on total rent charged for leasing real estate.75° Under this section,
total rent specifically includes "base rent. '75' The section goes on to say that
where there are required contractual payments taxable as total rent and those
that are not, reasonable allocation must be made between taxable and non-
taxable payments.752 In USCardio Vascular, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Revenue,753 USCardio Vascular (Landlord) made a lease agreement with a
physician group (Tenant).754 The lease agreement called for the payment of
"base rent." 755 The agreement also referred to center expenses and the rental
fee.756 The latter two items were synonymous with base rent.757 Included in
the definition of center expenses, and thus a part of base rent, were items
"such as salaries, benefits and insurance for the employees leased by the
[Landlord] to the [Tenant]. 758 Standing alone, the payments of these ex-
penses are not subject to the six percent tax.759 Landlord paid the excise tax
on the amount of lease payments it deemed subject to the tax but not on the
entire base rent.760 The Florida Department of Revenue assessed a deficiency
calculated on the entire base rent. 6 Its motion for summary judgment was
granted by the trial court.762 Landlord appealed, and the First District Court
of Appeal reversed.763 The First District Court of Appeal held that, regard-
less of how the payments were characterized, that is, as base rent, some of
the center expenses are not subject to the six percent tax.764 The case was
remanded for the trial court's determination of taxable and non-taxable pay-
ments under the lease agreement. 765 Judge Benton dissented. 766 He would
have held that the Landlord was bound by its use of "base rent" in the
750. FLA. STAT. § 212.031(1)(c) (2009).
751. Id.
752. Id.
753. 993 So. 2d 81 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied, 8 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. 2009).
754. Id. at 82.
755. Id.
756. Id. at 82-83.
757. Id. at 82-84.
758. USCardio Vascular, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 84-85 (footnote omitted).
759. Id. at 85.
760. See id. at 84.
761. Id.
762. Id.
763. USCardio Vascular, Inc., 993 So. 2d.at 82.
764. Id. at 85.
765. Id.
766. Id. at 85 (Benton, J., dissenting).
67
Landau: 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
agreement,767 which was described by the majority as "undoubtedly a poor
choice of words. 768
XV. TORTS
A. Negligence: Limitation of Liability of Professional
Witt v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc.7 69 involved a professional's-a li-
censed geologist's-attempt, by contractual provision, to limit his malprac-
tice liability.770 Mr. Witt (Geologist) was employed by Gerhardt M. Witt and
Associates, Inc. (Geologist's Corporation).77 ' Geologist's Corporation was
hired by La Gorce Country Club (Club) to consult on the design and install-
ment of a "reverse osmosis water treatment" project.772 The contract be-
tween Club and Geologist's Corporation contained a limit of liability provi-
sion.773 Despite numerous problems with the system, the project was even-
tually completed, but after fourteen months of continued deterioration, "the
system failed completely., 774 Club sued Geologist and Geologist's Corpora-
tion for, among other things, professional malpractice. 775  The trial judge
ruled that the contractual liability limitation was enforceable with respect to
Geologist's Corporation, but not with respect to Geologist personally, as a
professional.776 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.777 The limita-
tion of liability as to Geologist was unenforceable as a matter of law under
section 492.111(4) of the Florida Statutes-professional geologist's personal
liability. 778 As a matter of public policy, "[a] cause of action in negligence
against an individual professional exists irrespective, and essentially, inde-
pendent of a professional services agreement.
779
767. Id.
768. USCardio Vascular, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 85 (majority opinion).
769. 34 Fla. L. Weekly DI 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. June 10, 2009).
770. Id. at D1 161. The court also had before it issues involving arbitrability, "fraud in the
inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act." Id.
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. Witt, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at DI 161.
774. Id. at D 161-62.
775. Id. at DI 162.
776. Id.
777. Id. atDI63.
778. Witt, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at DI 162 (citing FLA. STAT. § 492.111 (2009)); see Moran-
sais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999).
779. Win, 34 Fa. L. Weekly at D! 163.
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B. Tortious Interference with Business or Contractual Relationship
The Palm Beach County Heath Care District (District) was created by
Florida statute.780 Its purpose was "'to maximize the health and well-being
of Palm Beach County residents by providing comprehensive planning, fund-
ing, and coordination of health care service delivery.' 781 It could "'sue and
be sued" and was also vested "with all sovereign immunity and limitations
provided by the State Constitution or general law."'' 782 The District em-
ployed Dr. Davis (Director) as its Trauma Agency director.783 Professional
Medical Education, Inc. (PME) provided training to Palm Beach County
emergency medical services employees. 784 The District would pay for the
training upon completion of the program. 78' Basic Trauma Life Support of
Florida, Inc. (BTLS) was an organization that certified the providers of med-
ical personnel training.786 Director wrote to BTLS after there had been some
disagreement between Director and the owner of PME regarding "necessary
documentation for reimbursement., 787 After the letter was sent, the contents
of which are not disclosed in the opinion, BTLS suspended PME's certifica-
tion.788 In the meantime, PME had contracted to provide instruction to Palm
Beach County Fire Rescue personnel, but the training was placed on "hold"
when told by Director that the District would not be paying for the train-
ing. 789PME sued the District and Director for defamation and the District
for tortious interference and conspiracy. 790 The trial court directed a verdict
for Director on the defamation count ruling that, under McNayr v. Kelly,
791
Director had absolute immunity as an "executive official of government"
who "was acting within the scope of his employment. '792 However, the trial
court let the jury's verdict of over $690,000 against the District on all counts
780. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist. v. Prof'l Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d 1090,
1092 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
781. Id. (quoting Palm Beach County Health Care Act, ch. 2003-326, § 3(2), 2003 Fla.
Laws 101, 102).
782. Id. (quoting Palm Beach County Health Care Act §6(6)).
783. Id. at 1093.
784. Id.
785. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1093.
786. Id.
787. Id.
788. Id.
789. Id.
790. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1093.
791. 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966).
792. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1093, 1095 (quoting McNayr,
184 So. 2d at 433).
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stand.793 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order
against the District.794 In order to sustain a tortious interference claim, the
defendant must be a "'stranger to the business relationship' 7 95 at issue and
can have no "'beneficial or economic interest in, or control over, that [busi-
ness] relationship.' 796 The District was an interested third party.797 It was
paying the bills, including those submitted by PME.798 Furthermore, the de-
famation count against the District was grounded on the action of Director,
the District's employee.799  The appellate court concluded that the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of Director was proper and therefore, Direc-
tor's immunity from the defamation claim had to exonerate the District.8"
As no wrongful acts were committed by the District and Director against
PME, there was no basis for a civil conspiracy action.
C. Investment Advice: Fraudulent Inducement
When Plaintiffs sold their company to Winstar Communications, Inc.
(Winstar) in 1998, they were paid eighty percent of the purchase price in
Winstar stock.802 They also were named as vice presidents of Winstar. °3
Winstar entered into an "investment banking relationship" with Salomon
Smith Barney, Inc. (SSB) in 1999, and some "transactions generated substan-
tial fees for SSB."8°4 The appellate court noted that the relationship between
Winstar and SSB "created incentives for SSB" to encourage potential and
current owners of Winstar stock, respectively, to buy and to hold Winstar
stock.8 °5 The evidence showed that the Winstar stock investment quality was
overstated by SSB analysts "through a series of communications with the
general public and with Winstar employees. ' 8° In addition, starting in Janu-
793. See id. at 1093.
794. Id. at 1096.
795. Id. at 1094 (quoting Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742
So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
796. Id. (quoting Nimbus Techs., Inc. v. SunnData Prods., Inc., 484 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11 th
Cir. 2007)).
797. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1094.
798. Id.
799. Id. at 1095.
800. Id.
801. Id. at 1096.
802. Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
803. Id. at 519.
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id.
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ary 2000, there were conference calls on a quarterly basis with an SSB ana-
lyst "who consistently reiterated the positive outlook [about] Winstar stock,"
and Plaintiffs were on the phone during these calls. 80 7 However, beginning
early in 2001, the analysts "were privately rating [the] stock at more negative
levels. '80 8 In April 2001, Winstar filed for bankruptcy protection and the
value of Winstar stock owned by Plaintiffs collapsed.8° Plaintiffs sued SSB
alleging that SSB had fraudulently induced them to buy and hold Winstar
stock.810 Plaintiffs alleged that they "justifiably relied on affirmative misre-
presentations" of SSB and its analysts in these quarterly calls, quarterly re-
ports, and the news, in their decision to purchase and retain Winstar stock. 81'
The parties agreed that New York law applied. 2 The trial court dismissed
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint with prejudice "for failure to allege a
sufficiently direct communication" to them by SSB, and for their "failure to
demonstrate that SSB had a duty to disclose any material information it may
have withheld." 83 Plaintiffs appealed, and the Third District Court of Ap-
peal acknowledged that New York recognizes a claim of fraudulent induce-
ment "to retain securities in reliance on a defendant's affirmative misrepre-
sentations. 8t 4 However, a plaintiff must allege facts that would prove justi-
fiable reliance, which here would have required that they allege delivery of
the misrepresentation from SSB to them, that they were induced by the mi-
srepresentation to retain their stock, and that their reliance on alleged misre-
presentation and their decision to hold the stock were both reasonable. 5
Plaintiffs failed to allege, nor could they "in good faith" have alleged, that
they ever asked the SSB representative any questions during the conference
calls, or that the SSB analyst even knew that Plaintiffs were on the line.8t 6
Under New York law, the alleged affirmative misrepresentation must be di-
rectly communicated to a plaintiff.87 Plaintiffs here were in the same posi-
807. Goldin, 994 So. 2d at 519. Plaintiffs alleged that they "participated" in the calls, but
the court noted that they could not "in good faith" allege that SSB or the analyst was aware of
the presence of Plaintiffs or of Plaintiffs' participation, or that Plaintiffs had asked any ques-
tions during the calls. Id. at 520.
808. Id. at 519.
809. Id.
810. Id.
811. Goldin, 994 So. 2d at 520.
812. Id. at519.
813. Id.
814. Id.
815. Id. at519-20.
816. Goldin, 994 So. 2d at 520.
817. Id.
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tion as any other stockholder.818 New York law does not recognize reliance
on publicly disseminated forecasts as justifiable. 819
D. Pre-injury Liability Release on Behalf of Minor Child
Several cases decided in the past year and a half have addressed the is-
sue of whether a parent's execution of a release absolving a commercial ac-
tivity from liability to a minor for injury-prior to the injury-is binding on
the minor child or the child's estate.8 20 Before discussing the Supreme Court
of Florida's answer to this important question in Kirton v. Fields (Fields
/),82 1 a little procedural history will help set the stage.822 In Fields v. Kirton
(Fields 1),823 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that such a waiver was
ineffective.824 In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
certified an implicit conflict with a Fifth District Court of Appeal case, Lantz
v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc.,825 where such a waiver was found effective.826 In
Fields I, the Fourth District Court of Appeal also certified the case as one of
great public importance.8 7 However, subsequent to the Fourth District
Court's decision in Fields I, and its certification of conflict with Lantz, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal decided Applegate v. Cable Water Ski, L.C.
(Applegate 1),828 where it agreed with the Fourth District in Fields 1.829 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Applegate I, however, did not recede from
Lantz.83 ° Instead it distinguished Lantz, finding that the issue there was
whether the trial court had correctly determined that the exculpatory provi-
sion involved was unambiguous.83' In addition, the Fifth District Court of
818. Id.
819. See id.
820. See Kirton v. Fields (Fields 11), 997 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2008); Applegate v. Cable
Water Ski, L.C. (Applegate 1), 974 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 95 (discussing Applegate 1).
821. 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008).
822. Id. at 351-52.
823. 961 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007), reh'g granted, 973 So. 2d 1121 (Fla.
2007).
824. Id. at 1130.
825. 717 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), overruled by, 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla.
2008).
826. Fields 1, 961 So. 2dat 1130.
827. Id.
828. 974 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
829. See id. at 1113 & n.1.
830. Id. at 1116.
831. Id. It is not disclosed in Lantz whether the issue of the effectiveness of such a release
was ever raised by the parties, and it apparently was not raised on appeal. See Lantz v. Iron
Horse Saloon, Inc., 717 So. 2d 590, 591-92 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), overruled by, 997
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Appeal in Applegate I certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida
as one of great public importance.832 Thus, there was then pending in the
Supreme Court of Florida the certification of conflict with Lantz by the
Fourth District, in Fields I, and the certification by the Fifth District in Ap-
plegate J.833 On December 11, 2008, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Fields
II, enunciated, as a matter of first impression, a public policy exception to the
general rule that pre-injury releases are enforceable if they are not ambiguous
and not equivocal. 834 The facts of the Fields II were that fourteen-year-old
Christopher Jones was fatally injured at Thunder Cross Motor Sports Park
(Park) after he was ejected from the all terrain vehicle he was driving when
he lost control of it.835 His father, "Bobby Jones, as Christopher's natural
guardian, [had earlier] signed a release and waiver of liability, assumption of
risk, and indemnity agreement" with the attraction's operator.836 Fields, as
personal representative (Personal Representative) of Christopher's estate,
sued the owners and the operators of Park (Park Owner) for wrongful
death.837 Park Owner argued that the claim was barred because of the execu-
tion of the release.838 The trial court agreed and granted Park Owner's sum-
mary judgment motion.839 Personal Representative appealed, and the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed, certifying the case to the Supreme Court
of Florida.8' ° In reaching its decision in Fields II, the Supreme Court ba-
lanced the well-recognized right of parents to make decisions for their minor
children-said by the Court to "derive[] from the liberty interest . . . in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the guarantee
of privacy in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution"-against the
State's parens patriae authority.84' After reviewing the case law from Florida
and other jurisdictions, the Court decided that the State's parens patriae au-
thority prevailed in this case, and that as a matter of public policy, a "pre-
injury release executed by a parent on behalf of their minor child is unenfor-
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008). The Fifth Circuit did not address this issue when it reached the con-
clusion that the language there was sufficiently "clear and unequivocal." Id. In any event, the
decision in Lantz has now been disapproved by the Supreme Court of Florida. See Kirton v.
Fields (Fields 11), 997 So. 2d 349, 358 (Fla. 2008).
832. Applegate I,974 So. 2d at 1116.
833. Id.; Fields v. Kirton (Fields 1), 961 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
834. Fields 11, 997 So. 2d at 358; Lantz, 717 So. 2d at 591-92 (citing Greater Orlando
Aviation Auth. v. Bulldog Airlines, Inc., 705 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
835. Fields 1I, 997 So. 2d at 351 (quoting Fields 1, 961 So. 2d at 1128).
836. Id. (quoting Fields 1, 961 So. 2d at 1128).
837. Id.
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. Fields 1I, 997 So. 2d at 351-52.
841. Fields il, 997 So. 2d at 352-53 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
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ceable" by commercial enterprises.842 However, the Court was careful to
note that even in the case of commercial enterprises, a parent could bind a
minor child to arbitrate, rather than litigate, personal injury claims. 843 The
Court did not decide if such releases will be upheld in the case of non-
commercial activities, nor did it set forth a test to determine what is classi-
fied as non-commercial activity as opposed to commercial activity, although
there was an in-depth discussion of decisions involving non-commercial ac-
tivities.8 In a concurring opinion, Justice Pariente made it clear that she did
not hold the view "that all releases from liability for non-commercial activi-
ties are automatically valid," and that there is still room to hold a non-
commercial activity liable for negligence in the face of a release.845 Justice
Wells dissented on the ground that it will often prove very difficult to draw a
bright line distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities.
46
According to Justice Wells, it is the legislature's duty to take up the issue of
the enforceability of pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of
their minor children.847
With respect to Applegate IH, after the Court's decision in Fields II, it
declined to review Applegate J.848
842. Id. at 358.
843. See id. at 355 (quoting Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 404 (Fla.
2005)).
844. See id. at 356-57.
845. Id. at 361-62 (Pariente, J., concurring).
846. Fields i, 997 So. 2d at 363 (Wells, J., dissenting). An example discussed in the case
questions whether "a Boy Scout or Girl Scout, YMCA, or church camp [is] a commercial
establishment or a community-based activity." Id.
847. Id. Pertinent legislation introduced in the Florida House of Representatives and the
Senate after Fields il was not passed. See Florida House of Representatives, Legislative
Tracking: Fla. HB 363 (2009), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/
billsdetail.aspx?Billld=40275&BillText=363&HouseChamber=-H&Sessionld=61&. HB 363
was introduced on January 14, 2009 but "[d]ied on [Unfinished Business] Calendar" on May
2, 2009. Id. The bill
[a]uthorize[d] natural guardians to waive [and] release, in advance, any claim or cause of ac-
tion that would accrue to any of their minor children to the same extent that any adult may do
so on his or her own behalf; provid[ed] that such waivers [and] releases are disfavored [and]
must be strictly construed against party claiming to be relieved of liability; provide[d] readabil-
ity requirements for wording of such waivers [and] releases, etc.
Id. A related bill, SB 886, was also withdrawn. See Florida Senate, Legislative Tracking:
Fla. SB 886 (2009), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/SectionsfBills/billsdetail.
aspx?Billld=40472&BillText=363&HouseChamber=-H&Sessionld=61 &.
848. Cable Water Ski, LLC v. Applegate (Applegate I), 5 So. 3d 668, 668 (Fla. 2009).
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XVI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Statute of Limitations on Debt Deficiency Collection
Ms. Arvelo (Borrower) bought a car and obtained auto financing from
Park Finance of Broward, Inc. (Lender) in 1999. 49 The finance agreement
provided that if Borrower missed a payment to Lender, the balance of her
debt would be immediately accelerated and due in full. 80 Borrower failed to
make her March 2002 payment.85' The auto was repossessed and sold by
Lender on August 7, 2002.852 After the debt was reduced by the amount of
net sale proceeds, 853 Borrower still owed Lender more than $6000 under the
finance agreement. 854 On May 29, 2007, Lender sued Borrower in county
court "for the deficiency amount plus accumulated interest. ' 855 Borrower
raised the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(b) of the
Florida Statutes and claimed that the limitations period commenced in
March 2002 when she missed a payment.856 If she was correct, then the May
29, 2007 lawsuit against Borrower was filed too late.857 Lender argued that
the agreement to pay the deficiency amount was tantamount to a separate
debt under the deficiency provision of the agreement-whereby Borrower
agreed to the deficiency if permitted by law-and the deficiency was not
determined until August 2002.858 Therefore, according to Lender, the law-
suit, started in May 2007, was within the five-year statute of limitations. 9
The county court agreed with Lender.860 The appellate division of the circuit
court affirmed, and Borrower petitioned the Third District Court of Appeal
for a writ of certiorari which was granted.86' The Court of Appeal reversed,
849. See Arvelo v. Park Fin. of Broward, Inc., 15 So. 3d 660, 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
850. Id.
851. Id.
852. Id.
853. Id. Lender subtracted $464 from the sale proceeds for expenses of repossession and
sale. Arvelo, 15 So. 3d at 662.
854. Id.
855. Id.
856. See id.
857. Id.
858. Arvelo, 15 So. 3d at 662. The appellate court distinguished this situation from the
rules that apply with respect to accrual of an action to foreclose on real estate. Id. at 663 n.4
(relying on Chrestensen v. Eurogest, Inc., 906 So. 2d 343, 345 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (citing FLA. STAT. § 702.06 (2009)).
859. Id. at 662.
860. Id.
861. Id.
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finding that there was one debt owed by Borrower.862 The deficiency amount
was part of that debt.86 3 Borrower's "post-repossession failure or refusal to
pay the deficiency [did not] 'reset the clock. ' '' 864 Had Borrower voluntarily
made a payment on the delinquent debt, that would have tolled the statute
under section 95.05(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes.865 The only post-default
payments made resulted from repossession and sale, and that does not toll the
statute of limitationS.81
B. Vendor's Lien on Real Estate
In Golden v. Woodward,867 Mr. Woodward Sr. (Transferor) and Mr. and
Mrs. Golden (Transferees) entered into an "Agreement to Sell Personal Real
Estate Property" in 2003 for $109,000.868 Transferees were to pay Transferor
$550 a month for seven years ($46,200), and at the end of seven years, make
a balloon payment of $62,800.869 Transferor did not take back a mortgage or
other security for payment.870 In 2004, Transferor gave Transferees a war-
ranty deed for the property.871  Transferor died in 2006, and Transferees
stopped making payments.872 The personal representative of Transferor's
estate sought to have a vendor's--equitable-lien placed on the property to
secure payment of the $89,000 purchase price balance.873 The basis of the
claim for a vendor's lien was to prevent unjust enrichment. 874 The trial court
granted the lien, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.875 A ven-
dor's lien "is 'a creature of equity, a lien implied to belong to a vendor for
the unpaid purchase price of land, where he has not taken any other lien or
security beyond the personal obligation of the purchaser.' 876 Equitable liens
862. Arvelo, 15 So. 3d at 662.
863. Id.
864. Id. at 663.
865. See id.
866. Id.
867. 15 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
868. See id. at 666.
869. Id.
870. See id.
871. Golden, 15 So. 3d at 667.
872. See id.
873. Id. at 666.
874. See id. at 667.
875. Id. at 668, 671.
876. Golden, 15 So. 3d at 669 (quoting Special Tax Sch. Dist. No. I of Orange County v.
Hillman, 179 So. 805, 809 (Fla. 1938)).
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may be granted on the basis of estoppel or unjust enrichment. 77 The 2003
agreement between Transferor and Transferees did not disappear by merger
with the 2004 warranty deed.878 Although merger of the sales contract into
the later deed is the general rule, it is not absolute and did not apply under
the facts of this case since that was not the intention of the parties.879
C. Jurisdiction over Loan Guarantors
Whitney National Bank (Bank) sued three individuals (Guarantors) who
resided in Tennessee, seeking to enforce their loan guarantees. 880 The bor-
rower was a Florida corporation that allegedly was in default on the loan.881
Guarantors claimed that Bank could not obtain personal jurisdiction over
them under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes,
because they were not residents of Florida, had "never engaged in business in
Florida," and did not, individually, own Florida real estate.882 Furthermore,
they all signed the guaranty in Tennessee, and there was nothing in the gua-
ranty that called for any performance or action by them in Florida.883 Gua-
rantors had provided financial statements to Bank.884 The trial court deter-
mined that the long-arm statute was satisfied.885 The First District Court of
Appeal reversed.886 The plaintiff must prove the defendant's "minimum con-
tacts" with Florida to comply with due process requirements.887 Simply sign-
ing a loan guaranty in favor of a Florida bank is not sufficient "minimum
contacts. 888 The appellate court noted that there was no forum selection
clause in the guaranty, but even if there had been, it was still necessary to
establish minimum contacts with the forum state absent a waiver of personal
877. Id. (quoting Plotch v. Gregory, 463 So. 2d 432, 436 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
878. Seeid.at671.
879. Id.; see Polk Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Dwiggins, 147 So. 855, 857 (Fla. 1933); Milu,
Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
880. See Labry v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, AB9G, LLC, 8 So. 3d 1239, 1239 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
881. Id.
882. Id. at 1240-41.
883. Id. at 1241.
884. Id.
885. See Labry, 8 So. 3d at 1239.
886. Id. at 1242.
887. Id. at 1240.
888. Id. at 1241 (citing Holton v. Prosperity Bank of St. Augustine, 602 So. 2d 659, 662-
63 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). Contra Kane v. Am. Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So. 2d
974, 975-76 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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jurisdiction.889 The fact that financial statements were furnished by the gua-
rantors to the Florida creditor made no significant difference.89 °
D. Enforcement of Foreign Judgment
Creditor sought recognition, in the Miami-Dade Circuit Court, of Credi-
tor's judgment for $236,900 against Debtor obtained from a court in Argen-
tina.891 The trial court entered judgment for the amount of the foreign judg-
ment, and Debtor filed an appeal with the Third District.892 Debtor also per-
suaded the trial judge to stay enforcement of the judgment during the ap-
peal.893 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.894 While the trial court
may consider a stay pursuant to rule 9.3 10 of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, under section 55.607 of the Florida Statutes, a stay here would
only have been proper if the debtor had "satisfie[d] the [trial] court that an
appeal is pending," or that the debtor "intend[ed] to appeal"-but only if a
stay has been issued by the foreign court.895 The trial judge should have fol-
lowed the Florida Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Rec-
ognition Act.896 The Uniform Act requires that domesticated foreign judg-
ments be enforced in the same way as a judgment rendered by a court in
Florida.897
XVII. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
The following is an update on two homestead cases mentioned in the
2006-2007 Survey.898 On rehearing en banc in Cutler v. Cutler,8 the Third
District Court of Appeal again affirmed the trial court's decision that the
decedent's residence, which she had conveyed to a land trust not long before
her death and that was to be distributed on her death to her estate for further
889. Labry, 8 So. 3d at 1241-42 (citing Hamilton v. Bus. Assistance Consortium, Inc.,
602 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
890. Id. at 1242.
891. See Tettamanti v. Opcion Sociedad Anonima, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D917, D917 (3d
Dist. Ct. App. May 6, 2009) (per curiam).
892. Id.
893. Id.
894. Id.
895. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.607 (2009)).
896. See FLA. STAT. §§ 55.601-.607; Tettamanti, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D917.
897. See Tettamanti, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D917. The appellate court noted that it would
then be necessary that a bond be posted by Debtors under rule 9.310 of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id.
898. Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 590, at 119 n.1272, 121 n.1294.
899. 994 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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distribution under the terms of her will to her daughter, did not, merely by
being held in the trust, lose its status as protected homestead. 9°° The resi-
dence, however, did lose its protected homestead status by virtue of a provi-
sion in the decedent's will that provided that the property could be used to
pay claims against her estate in the event that her residuary estate was insuf-
ficient.90' The appellate court noted that the specific direction in her will,
that the home be used to satisfy debts if the residuary was insufficient, "was
the equivalent of ordering [the home] sold and the proceeds distributed to
pay debts. 9 °2 Thus, under Florida law, the property lost its status as pro-
tected homestead.9 °3 Judge Shepherd dissented.9°4
In another case decided at about the same time as Cutler, Phillips v.
Hirshon,9 5 the Third District Court of Appeal held that for purposes of limi-
tations on and rules regarding devise and descent, a cooperative apartment is
not homestead, but certified the conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida.9°6
The Supreme Court initially accepted jurisdiction, but then reversed its deci-
sion to review the matter.9 v
900. See id. at 342.
901. Id. at 345.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 346-47.
904. See Cutler, 994 So. 2d at 347 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
905. 958 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
906. Id. at 430-3 1.
907. Levine v. Hirshon, 980 So. 2d 1053, 1053 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
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